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1Chapter 1: Introduction
The German Unification had its 20th anniversary this year on 3 October.
For over forty years (1949-1990) Germany was divided into east and west.
The border and particularly the Berlin Wall between the democracy in the
west and a repressive regime in the east symbolized the division between
two systems and societies. The shootings of fugitives at the Berlin Wall
constituted the most dramatic examples of the violence exercised by the
socialist state in the east.1 The instructions which were given to the border
guards who implemented the policy of the leadership were aimed at
preventing flight at all costs.2 At least 264 people were killed at the inner-
German border between 1961 and 1989.3
After Unification in 1990, Germany had to challenge the question, how to
resolve the past and how to deal with the past injustices from the socialist
regime. Germany used different instruments to resolve the past. The most
effective yet the most controversial way were the criminal prosecutions of
1 Gerhard Werle, “Criminal justice and state criminality: The current German position”,
in: Merdard Rwelamira/Gerhard Werle (eds.), Confronting Past Injustices Approaches to
Amnesty, Punishment, Reparation and Restitution in South Africa and Germany, Human
Rights  and  Constitutional  Law  Series  of  the  Community  Law  Centre,  University  of  the
Western Cape, Durban: Butterworths, pp. 21-31 (1996), 27.
2 Manfred J. Gabriel, “Coming to Terms with the East German Border Guard Cases”,
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 38. Vol., pp. 375-418 (1999) 375.
3 Atkinson, “Searching for Truth by the Wall- East German Files Reveal New Cases of
Fatal Refugee Shootings”, Washington Post, (Aug. 12, 1993) at A29.
Organizations representing the victims´ families speak of almost 1000 dead persons.
European Court of Human Rights, Case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.Germany,
Applic. nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, judgment of 22 March 2001, para. 13,
[Online] http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/orig/01_2/Streletz.pdf (accessed on 12
October 2010). See also Klaus Marxen, Gerhard Werle, Die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung
von DDR- Unrecht- Eine Bilanz, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter (1999), 174; Toralf
Rummler, Die Gewalttaten an der deutsch-deutschen Grenze vor Gericht, Berlin: Berliner
Wissenschafts-Verlag (2000), 1.
 
 
 
 
2the leadership officials who served the former suppressive regime. The
border guards and their superiors were convicted for homicide.
After an overview of the transition process and the different mechanism
used to resolve the past, this research paper will focus on the conviction of
the former political leadership whose decisions led to the shootings at the
wall. The convictions stand as a symbol of transitional criminal justice. The
cases went through all judicial instances in Germany up to the level of the
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR). They are a
“significant part of the effort of joining two societies and building a stable
democracy for the future”.4 The main focus of  the research paper will  be
an analysis of the application of judicial concepts under which the East
German members of the Political Bureau were convicted and how this has
been assessed by the ECHR. Of utmost importance will be the
jurisprudence in respect of what has become known as the concept of “the
perpetrator behind the perpetrator” (Täter hinter dem Täter). The German
courts acknowledged that a person who acts through another may be
individually criminally responsible, regardless of whether the direct
perpetrator is also responsible. The research will analyze the limitation of
the prohibition of retroactive punishment and the human rights friendly
interpretation of East German law. This paper will also discuss the trials
against the Congolese warlords Katanga and Chui and the warrant of
arrest against the Sudanese President Al Bashir in order to prove the
influence of the German jurisprudence on the practice of the International
Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC). Of special interest will be the analysis of
4 Gabriel (1999), 375.
 
 
 
 
3the principle of “perpetration-by-means” applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber
and the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC in these cases. In addition, the
paper will focus on the international application and the impact of this
principle. The aim of the research paper is to demonstrate that the
German border guard trials have given rise to important precedents, both
national and international, which had and still have an impact on trials of
the former leadership of a despotic state. The research will prove the
influence of the decisions of the German courts on the precedents and will
evaluate if the applied principles can be adopted in other states which
have to come to terms with their past.
Twenty years after German Unification the so called border guard cases
can be regarded not only in the sense that they strengthened the transition
process, but also as a precedence in transnational criminal justice and as
a gain for international law.
Chapter 2: Historical and Political Background
I. The way to German Unification
After the German capitulation World War II ended on May 8 of 1945. The
allies divided Germany in four occupation zones. The Federal Republic of
Germany (hereinafter FRG) in the west was occupied by the French, the
British and the U.S.5 The Soviet occupied and administrated the eastern
5 Berlin Regional Court, Case of Kessler, Streletz and Albrecht, No. (527) 2 Js 26/90 Ks
(10/92), judgment of 16 September 1993, in: Klaus Marxen, Gerhard Werle (eds.),
Strafjustiz und DDR-Unrecht, Dokumentationen, Gewalttaten an der deutsch-deutschen
Grenze,  Band  2/2.  Teilband,  Berlin:  De  Gruyter  501-  598  (2002),  para.  5;  Christoph
Schaefgen, “Dealing with the Communist Past- Prosecutions after German
Reunification”, in Werle (ed.), Justice in Transition- Prosecution and Amnesty in Germany
and South Africa, Band 29, Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, pp. 15- 26 (2006), 15.
 
 
 
 
4Zone, and soon began to establish a communist system with a socialist
government, the German Democratic Republic (hereinafter GDR).6 In
1949 a constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) was adopted in the FGR
which contained in its preamble that the German people and the
government seek the unification of Germany as a free nation.7 The
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands- hereinafter SED) emerged in the east and key positions in
the government and the judiciary were filled by party members. Private
industries were nationalized and a planned economy introduced.8 The
communist regime turned into a dictatorial system which did not tolerate
political opposition. There was no separation of powers as conceived of by
the concept of rule of law.9 Dissidents and those trying to escape were
systematically kept under observation by the Ministry of State Security
(Ministerium für Staatssicherheit) and were treated strictly.10 The
oppressive measures taken by the GDR government led to increasing
flight from the East to the West. Many people fled by crossing the inter-
German border illegally.11
Berlin had a special legal status for all victorious powers and was
6 See J. P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone And Soviet Policy in Germany 1945-50, Oxford
University Press (1951), 74-113.
7 Gabriel (1999), 380.
8 See Henry Ashby Turner, The Two Germanies since 1954, London: Yale University Press
 (1987), 109.
9 Marxen/Werle, (1999), 54, Gabriel (1999), 410.
10 In 40 years the Ministry of State Security formed an extensive and highly hierarchical
structure with almost 90.000 full-time stuff by the end. Gerhard Werle, Moritz
Vormbaum, “After the Fall of the Berlin Wall – Transitional Justice in Germany”, pp. 1-54
(2010, forthcoming), 4; Marxen/Werle (1999), 75 et seq.
11 Gabriel (1999), 381; Norman Gelb, The Berlin Wall, New York: Crown Publishing Group
(1987), 39, 57-64.
 
 
 
 
5therefore also divided into four zones.12 By the height of the Cold War in
1961, East Germany had lost more than 2.5 million inhabitants to illegal
emigration into West Germany. In response the government sealed and
protected the border between East and West Germany.13 In August 1961
barricades were erected and the Berlin Wall was built within days. This
fortification was reinforced by automatic-fire systems and antipersonnel
mines.14 The political leaders of the GDR fortified the border, while
insisting that it was an “anti-fascist wall”, to protect the East German
population from the “fascist” west.15 The GDR denied its inhabitants the
right to leave the country and the attempt to flee was a serious crime.16
The situation changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A peaceful
revolution in East Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 led to the
end of the repressive system. After the SED General Secretary Erich
Honecker resigned, the entire GDR government followed. On 18 March
1990, the first free elections were held in East Germany. On 3 October
1990, the GDR officially joined the FRG on the basis of the Unification
Treaty and the law of the FRG extended to East Germany. 17
12 Schaefgen (2006), 15.
13 Gelb (1987), 64.
14 Beate Rudolf, „Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany. App. Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97,
& 44801/98.49 ILM (2001), European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, March
22, 2001”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 4, pp. 905-910
(October 2001), 905.
15 German Propaganda Archive, “What should you know about the Wall”, (February
1962), [Online] http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/wall.htm (accessed  on  12
October 2010).
16 Gabriel (1999), 381; In severe cases, the “illegal border violation” was punishable by
one to eight years of imprisonment. See Robert Alexy, „Mauerschützen: Zum Verhältnis
von Recht, Moral und Strafbarkeit“, Hamburg (1993). in: Alexy/Koch/Kuhlen/Rüßmann,
Elemente einer juristischen Begründungslehre, Baden-Baden, pp. 469-492 (2003), 480.
17 Werle/Vormbaum (2010, forthcoming), 5; Schaefgen (2006), 16.
 
 
 
 
6II. Transition and Criminal Justice
1. West Germany as a mature democracy
It was the second time that a totalitarian state in recent Germany passed
out of existence. The unified Germany had to deal with past state injustice
and faced the question of individual guilt.18
The fall of the Berlin Wall was a “symbol of the will for freedom of the
people, for historical possibilities and the historical defiance, [and] for
future politics to configure themselves on equality, fairness, and real
democracy”.19 However, this symbolic event did not create a new society
based on justice and trust. The past had to be resolved which included
calling the previous leaders and their henchman to account. The transition
process in Germany was different from other countries, challenging to
resolve the past. There are three different types of transition societies. The
post- conflict societies, authoritarian and conflict- ridden societies, and
mature democracies.20 Given the fact that West Germany was a stable
and affluent democracy, the transition process of East Germany can be
classified as a transition to a mature society. The transition process from
socialism to democracy was not only privileged because the GDR
accessed to the FRG, but also that West German judges had to apply
former East German law. Germany had over forty years experience with
18 The unique term “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” which can be best translated in
“mastering the past” or “resolving the past” describes this process, Gabriel, (1999), 376.
19 Newsletter Stiftung Aufarbeitung, 20 Years Peaceful Revolution and German Unity
(May 2009), 3 [Online] available:
http://www.stiftungaufarbeitung.de/downloads/news/News20years.pdf
(accessed on 14 September 2010).
20 David A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework,” Ethics  &
International Affairs, Vol. 13, pp. 43 et seq. (2004), 43-44; Gabriel (1999), 379.
 
 
 
 
7the traditions of the Rechtsstaat (the state under the rule of law).21
Therefore a functional justice and administrative system existed which
made it possible to investigate and prosecute.
2. Mechanisms to resolve the past
The unification involved the challenge of bringing two states together, to
reconcile the perpetrators and the victims, and to format and consolidate
trust in the reunified Germany as a state by the rule of law. Those
expectations could not be fulfilled with criminal law alone.22 To confront the
past and deal with the GDR injustices all tools of transitional justice were
used.
a) Rehabilitation
The SED- regime combat political enemies within the country with
coercive measures such as imprisonment, forced resettlement, and
professional bans which led to deprivation of freedom or loss of property.23
Furthermore the victims suffered from being marked as criminals.
Art. 17 of the Unification Treaty24 emphasized the intention to create the
legal basis for rehabilitating any persons “who were victims of politically
motivated criminal prosecutions or other legal decisions that violated rule
of law and the constitution”. Art. 18 and Art. 19 provided that criminal
21 James A. McAdams, “Communism on Trial: The East German Past and the
German Future”, in: James A. McAdams (ed.), Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in
New Democracies, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 239-268 (1997), 239.
22 Schaefgen (2006), 17.
23 Martin Ludwig, “Die Rehabilitierung der Opfer”, in: Albin Eser, Jörg Arnold (eds.),
Strafrecht in Reaktion auf Systemunrecht, Band 2, Deutschland, Freiburg: iuscrim edition
(2000), 434 et seq; Werle/Vormbaum (2010, forthcoming), 6.
24 Unification Treaty of the FGR and the GDR of 31 August 1990 (BGBl II, p. 889).
 
 
 
 
8conviction and administrative acts could be reversed. Two laws were
enacted to concern criminal and administrative rehabilitation.25 Their strict
requirements narrowed the scope which was originally intended by the
Unification Treaty and full compensation was not generally awarded.26
Rehabilitation for everyone was difficult, since the majority of East German
citizens were disadvantaged by the measures taken by the SED
government. However, it can be criticized that no exclusively moral
reparations were possible due to the reparations provisions inseparably
linked rehabilitation and compensation.27
b) Restitution of property
The Property Law28 regulated the restitution of expropriate and
nationalized real estate and means of production. Therefore the
Trusteeship Agency was established which was responsible for
administering and privatizing East German state industries.29 Given the
long-past systematic expropriation, unemployment in the east and the lack
of competitive infrastructure for business, a complete resumption was not
possible. The numerous laws enacted to regulate restitution demonstrate
that the lawmakers tried hard to find suitable and fair solutions.30
25 Rehabilitation Laws of 4 November 1992 (BGBl I, p. 1814) and of 23 June 1994 (BGBl. I,
p. 1311).
26 Ludwig (2000), 453.
27 Ibid. 463; Werle/Vormbaum (2010, forthcoming), 8.
28 Enacted on 3 August 1992 (BGBl. I, p. 1446).
29 Hermann-Josef Rodenbach, „Die Reprivatisierung in den neuen Bundesländern“, in:
Georg Brunner (ed.), Juristische Bewältigung des kommunistischen Unrechts in
Osteuropa und Deutschland, Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz (1995), 290.
30 Werle/Vormbaum, (2010, forthcoming), 12.
 
 
 
 
9c) Access to “Stasi” files
A federal agency was established to archive and administer the numerous
files of the Ministry for State Security which spied the East German
citizens for forty years. The Stasi File Law promoted historical and legal
research. It made it possible for East Germans to access their files and
granted information on who gave information about them to the regime.31.
This has caused thousands of public employees to be dismissed. Some
democratic leaders were revealed as former informants.32
d) Purging of the public sector
After Reunification the Civil Service Law of the FRG applied to East
Germany because Art. 3 of the Unification Treaty declared the Basic Law
applicable to the new eastern states.33 Servants from the public sector
were screened for possible activity as informers. Their removing was a
serious intervention in the lives of many eastern Germans. Among other
sectors the courts were purged, the incriminated judges were replaced by
West German judges.34 After the East Germans had lived 12 years under
Nazi dictatorship and 43 years under the suppressive communist regime,
a clear signal was necessary for citizens to gain renewed confidence in
31 Behörde der Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi –Unterlagen, www.bstu.bund.de,
Akteneinsicht [Online]
http://www.bstu.bund.de/cln_012/nn_715182/DE/Akteneinsicht/akteneinsicht_
_node.html__nnn=true (accessed on 11 March 2010).
32 Jamal Benomar, “Confronting the Past: Justice after Transitions”, Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January 1993), 6, [Online]
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v004/4.1benomar.pdf
(accessed on 10 March 2010).
33 Werle/Vormbaum (2010, forthcoming), 17, 18.
34 Michael Bohlander, “United We Stand- The Judiciary in East Germany After the
Unification”, Anglo-American Law Review, Vol. 21 (1992), 415, 422, 423.
 
 
 
 
10
the system. The aim was to strengthen East Germans´ trust in the
democratic system and the public administrative apparatus.35
e) Enquete Commission
Between 1992 and 1998 two Enquete Commissions of the German
Bundestag (parliament) investigated the history of the SED dictatorship
and its effects on German Unity.36 The aims were the strengthening of
democratic self-confidence and the further development of a common
political culture in Germany. The Commissions’ aims were national
reconciliation, the deterrence and prevention of future dictatorship and that
the Bundestag addresses the legacy of communism.37
As a result its' recommendations, in 1998 a publicly funded “Foundation
for the Reconciliation of the SED Dictatorship” to coordinate research,
educational activities and assistance to victims’ organizations was
established.38 The Commission established the awareness for the past
and the huge amount of information contained in the report is of great
historical and political value.
35 Werle/Vormbaum(2010, forthcoming), 17, 18.
36 Newsletter Stiftung Aufarbeitung (2009), 16.
37 Deutscher Bundestag, Materialien der Enquete-Kommission ,Beschlussempfehlung
und Bericht der Enquete-Kommission, „Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der
SED-Diktatur in Deutschland“ (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages), Vol. 1, 29,
188, Drucksache 13/11000 vom 10.06.1998.
38 Andrew H. Beattie, “An Evolutionary Process: Contributions of the Bundestag Inquiries
into East Germany to an Understanding of the Role of Truth commissions”, International
Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 3, Issue 2, pp. 229-249 (2009), 246; see also
Homepage Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur www.stiftung-
aufarbeitung.de.
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f) Criminal prosecutions instead of amnesty
A general amnesty as a concrete alternative to criminal prosecution was
rejected. The reunified Germany had decided to prosecute the
perpetrators for their injustices.39 Those who supported an amnesty
believed that prosecutions would make the reconciliation process more
difficult because they would create tensions among East Germans.40
Furthermore they argued that prosecutions would take too long and were
too expensive. However, not investigating the crimes that had been
committed would have sent the wrong signal to the victims.41
Amnesty is only an option for dealing with the past when leaders agree to
end a conflict or allow democracy only under the condition of impunity for
crimes committed under their regime.42 In transitions of South Africa or
Argentina, amnesty was the price of a peaceful transfer of power and
negotiated freedom.43 Given that the communist system had ended
following a peaceful revolution and voluntary accession to the FRG there
was no reason to refrain from prosecutions.
The Unification Treaty provided that acts committed in the GDR were to be
prosecuted in unified Germany. The rule of law (Rechtsstaatsprinzip)
determined in Art. 20 (3) Basis Law, demands that a state which enforces
39 Schaefgen (2006), 16.
40 Amnesty was demanded by PDS member (the follow up party of the SED),
documented by Kai Rossig, Anye Rost, “Alternativen zur strafrechtlichen Ahndung des
DDR-Systemunrechts”, in Eser, Albin/ Arnold, Jörg (eds), Strafrecht in Reaktion auf
Systemunrecht, Band 82.2 Deutschland, Freiburg: iuscrim edition, 521-536 (2000), 525.
41 Werle/Vormbaum (2010, forthcoming), 21.
42 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Law, 2nd Edition,  The  Hague:  TMC  Asser
Press (2009), para. 207.
43 See A. Marcelo Sancinetti, Marcelo Ferrante, in Eser/Arnold (eds.), Strafrecht in
Reaktion auf Systemunrecht, Band 82.3 Argentinien, Freiburg: iuscrim edition (2002).
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its monopoly on the use of force, must enact and apply criminal laws to
protect private rights.44 Thereby the judiciary was obliged to undertake
criminal prosecutions.
The unified Germany decided to prosecute the crimes committed by the
high ranking GDR officials. The institutionalized injustice of the GDR urged
the German courts not to make the mistakes made in dealing with the Nazi
past, when prosecution of perpetrators was neglected, again.45 The trials
after Nuremberg in which high ranking Nazi officials were charged were
perceived as a failure. The atrocities of the Nazis were represented as
“something that had happened to the Germans rather than something
done by the Germans”.46 It can be seen as the Germans´ second guilt that
they failed to admit openly to their Nazi past. In not dealing with the past
atrocities “on a personal, social, and legal level they denied the post war
generation the chance of understanding and facing their background.” 47
The criminal prosecutions of the former GDR leaders made a significant
contribution to elucidating the past. Since the beginning of the systematic
prosecutions in October 1990 the judiciary did not change the course.48 It
was not an easy decision how far down the chain the prosecutions should
reach.49 The courts had to convict obvious violations of human rights and
had to abide application of statutory law at the same time. The criminal
44 Gerd Pfeiffer (ed.), Strafprozessordnung Kommentar, 6th Edition, Munich: C.H. Beck
Verlag (2008), § 152.
45 Neil  J.  Kritz,  “The  Dilemmas  of  Transnational  Justice”,  in:  Kritz  (ed.), Transitional
Justice, Vol. II, Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace Press (1995), xix-xxx
(1995,) xxx.
46 Gabriel (1999), 377
47 Ibid.
48 Schaefgen (2006), 16.
49 Kritz (1995), xxiii.
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prosecutions of the unjust system as a mechanism to resolve the past
were discussed very controversially. The trials were of high public interest
and therefore received positive and negative perceptions. One should
keep in mind that prosecutions determine individual guilt and should not
be perceived as a collective accusation of guilt. The purpose of criminal
prosecutions is not to crack down one particular case for all occurred past
abuses. However, the identification with an accused which stands for the
prior system is inevitable.
Even before the first free elections in 1990, investigations began under the
successor government against members of the political leadership and
high ranking officials of the previous regime. The systematic criminal
prosecution of government crimes, such as electoral fraud, abuse of
power, corruption, doping and perversion of justice committed under the
SED dictatorship continued into 2005.50 The trials referred to the crimes at
the inner-German border were of special interest from the public, as well
as from the legal point of view.51
The prosecutions cannot be assessed as “victor´s justice”. East Germany
acceded voluntarily to the FGR. The West did not judge about the past of
the former East German citizens.52 The courts judged serious human
rights violations committed by perpetrators who served a repressive
50 McAdams (1997), 239 et seq; Werle/Vormbaum (2010, forthcoming), 25.
51 Ibid.; See Rummler (2000).
52 Erardo Cristoforo Rautenberg, „Die strafrechtliche Aufarbeitung des DDR-
Systemunrechts im Land Brandenburg aus staatsanwaltschaftlicher Sicht“, in: Klaus
Christoph Clavée, Wolf Kahl, Ramona Pisal (eds.), 10 Jahre Brandenburgisches
Oberlandesgericht, Festschrift zum 10jährigen Bestehen, Nomos-Verlagsgesellschaft,
Baden-Baden (2003), 97-130.
 
 
 
 
14
system. The convictions put “the final stamp of illegality”53 on the previous
communist regime. Approximately 100,000 investigations were
undertaken, only 1,286 persons were accused and only 750 of them were
convicted in the end.54 The killings at the border led to 385 judgments, 110
ended in acquittals, 275 in convictions.55 This demonstrates that West
Germany followed the principles of the rule of law and did not arbitrary
pick out a few of the many perpetrators who had served the repressive
system and participated in it.
3. The German transition in comparison with others
The German experience has to be distinguished from the Latin American
and African transitions. The latter had a hard-won transition from
dictatorship to democracy.56 Germany was already a stable parliamentary
democracy with functioning institutions when the mechanisms to resolve
the past were set up.57 The repressive communist regime in Eastern
Europe collapsed rapidly at the end of the 1980s whereas countries such
South Africa or Argentina struggled a long time to cope with the prior
system characterized by violence.58 As mentioned above, in the African
53 Peter E. Quint, “Judging the Past: The Prosecution of East German Border Guards and
the GDR Chain of Command”, The Review of Politics, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 303-329 (Spring
1999), 327 [Online] http://www.jstor.org/stable/1408359 (accessed on 25 March 2010).
54 Rainer Eppelmann, „Zum Geleit“, in: Marxen/Werle/Schäfer, Die Strafverfolgung von
DDR-Unrecht – Fakten und Zahlen, Berlin: Stiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur,
pp. 3-4 (2007), 4.
55 Ibid.; Werle/Vormbaum (2010, forthcoming), 48.
56 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes against Humanity, The Struggle for Global Justice, Penguin
Books, 3rd Edition (2006), 321.
57 Beattie (2009), 232.
58 On the Argentinian transition process see Sancinetti/Ferrante (2002).
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and South American countries, the assurance of impunity was often the
price paid for a negotiated transition.59
There is also a difference between the committed crimes. In Eastern
Germany the systematic human rights violations were committed being
covered by the law and were not as of the great extent as in the South
African and American repressive systems.60
Due to the different conditions, the transition in Germany had another
purpose, other effects and results.
Chapter 3: The Border guard trials
I. Factual Background
1. Hierarchical structures of the Political Bureau and the National
Defence Council
The Political Bureau (Politbüro) was the political leadership council of the
SED, and the most powerful political body in East Germany.61 This ruling
organ of the GDR made some decisions which perfected, strengthened,
and perpetuated the border regime. Its task was to set policies and
guidelines for the GDR Defence Ministry, such as plans for installing land
59 A “negotiated revolution” can lead to significant limitations on the confrontation with
the past. In the case of South Africa, amnesty was needed to promote reconciliation and
reconstruction. See Gerhard Werle (ed.), Justice in Transition (2006), Session Two: The
South Africa Approach, 39- 150.
60 Robertson (2006), 321. Roberston states that the torture, disappearances and the
other measures were not extreme enough to warrant the description of crimes against
humanity.
61 Adrian Webb, The Longman Companion to Germany since 1945, Longman Companions
to History (1998), 83; ECHR, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.Germany, judgment of 22
March 2001, para. 14.
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mines along the border.62 Members of the Political Bureau decided to
erect, seal and protect the borders to the west.63 The Political Bureau
created the National Defence Council (Nationaler Verteidigungsrat
hereinafter NDC) as a state-owned organ in the areas of security, military,
border protection and national defence. The NDC received legislative and
executive authorization and was well organized. Every decision of the
NDC corresponded to the pretended orientation of the Political Bureau.
The Border Protection Act64 which allowed the shootings at the Wall was
planned and enacted by the committee of the Political Bureau and the
NDC.65
2. The main defendants in the border general trials
The defendants of the former GDR leadership in the border guard general
cases were Heinz Kessler, Fritz Streletz, Egon Krenz and Günter
Schabowski.
Kessler had a leadership role in the GDR army upon it was founded in
1956, and became secretary of defence in 1985.66 Streletz was  also  a
powerful figure in the Ministry of Defence for decades. He was chief of
staff of the GDR army, and deputy minister of the NDC.67 Krenz was  a
62 See  Constitution  of  the  GDR  amendment  of  1974  Art.  73  (DDR-Gbl.  I,  p.  432);  Uwe
Wesel, Ein Staat vor Gericht: Der Honecker- Prozess, Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn Verlag
(1994), 10-18.
63 Berlin Regional Court, Case of Schabowski, Kleiber and Krenz, No. (527) 25/2 Js 20/92
Ks (1/95), judgment of 25 August 1997, para. 85, in: Marxen/Werle (eds.), Strafjustiz und
DDR-Unrecht (2002), 645-890.
64 Law on the Bordero f the German Democratic Republic, Border Protection Act (Gesetz
über die Staatsgrenze der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik- Grenzgesetz), of 25
March 1982, (DDR-GBl. I, p.197).
65 Berlin Regional Court, Krenz, judgment of 25 August 1997, paras. 37 et seq.
66 Quint (1999), 306.
67 Ibid.; Berlin Regional Court, Streletz, judgment of16 September 1993, paras. 34, 35.
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member of the Political Bureau and the NDC from 1983 on and for a short
time in the revolutionary days of 1989 he was the general secretary of the
SED next to Erich Honecker, the SED party leader.68 Schabowski was the
editor of the SED party newsletter and the party leader in Berlin. He was a
member of the Political Bureau from 1984 on.69
All defendants had high positions and were involved in the committee
decisions on border protection of the Political Bureau in 1984 and 1987.70
3. The conviction of the defendants
The cases went through all judicial instances in Germany, from the Berlin
Regional Court to the Federal Supreme Court up to the Federal
Constitutional Court.
By a decision of the Berlin Regional Court Streletz was sentenced to five
years and six months and Kessler to seven years and six months
imprisonment for incitement to commit intentional homicide, on the ground
that they shared responsibility for the deaths of seven people who were
shot by attempting to flee across the border.71
The Berlin Regional Court first declared Krenz guilty of incitement for
murder (Art. 22 § 2 (1) and 112 § 1 of the StGB-DDR). Then the court
applied the criminal law of the FRG, as being more lenient than GDR´s
criminal law and convicted him as an indirect principal in the intentional
68 Federal Court of Berlin, Krenz, judgment of 25 August 1997, para. 6.
69 Ibid. para. 5.
70 Ibid. para. 90 et seq.
71 Berlin Regional Court, Streletz, judgment of 16 September 1993, para. 3.
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homicide (Art. 25 and 212 of the StGB).72 Krenz were sentenced to six
years and six months imprisonment. Due to the fact he participated in
decisions of the Political Bureau and the NDC on the GDR`s border
policing regime, he shared responsibility for the deaths of four people who
had attempted to flee the GDR between 1984 and 1989. They were shot
by East German border guards by crossing the border. The Berlin
Regional Court convicted Krenz, Schabowski and Kleiber as indirect
perpetrators and stated that they acted in joint commission through their
participation in the decision of the Political Bureau.73
On appeal, the Federal Court of Justice, affirmed on every point the
judgments of the Courts of the first instance and found the defendants
guilty of indirect participation in homicide. It stated that killing of fugitives at
the border contributed as arbitrary deprivation of life in violation of
established international law.74
The Federal Constitutional Court upheld the convictions of all four
applicants and stated that the prohibition of retroactive punishment
determined in Art. 103 (2) of the FRG´s Basic Law is not violated because
it does not refer to a state which never respected fundamental rights.75
72 Berlin Regional Court, Krenz, judgment of 25 August 1997, para 273, 275, 276.
73 Ibid. para. 273.
74 Federal Supreme Court, Appeal of Schabowski, Kleiber and Krenz, No: 5 StR 632/98,
judgment  of  8  November  1999,  para.  51,  (BGHSt  45,  270)  in:  Werle/Marxen  (eds.)
(2002), 891-910; Appeal of Keßler, Streletz and Albrecht,  No.  5  StR 98/94,  judgment  of
26 July 1994, BGHSt 40, 218, in: Werle/Marxen (eds.)(2002), 599-608.
75 Federal Constitutional Court, Beschluss zur Nichtannahme der
Verfassungsbeschwerde, Streletz, No. 2 BvR 1875/94; 2 BvR 1852/94; 2 BvR 1853/94, 2
BvR 1875/94, decision of 24 October 1996 in: Werle/Marxen (eds.) (2002), 609-642.;
Krenz,  Az.  2  BvQ 60/99,  2  BvR 241/99,  decision of  12 January  2000,  in:  Werle/Marxen
(eds.) (2002), 911-914.
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II. Legal issues
The courts had to resolve fundamental legal questions to convict the
defendants. The applicable law had to be determined. Was it the law in
East Germany, written in the statute books or the secret orders to kill
fugitives at the border rather than to permit escape? Or should they follow
the notions of morality to deal with the state injustice and with that assume
at the same time that the previous rules of the GDR cannot be law? That
led to the most controversial question: Does the prohibition of retroactive
punishment apply if an unjust repressive system becomes a rule-of-law
democracy?
1. Unification Treaty: Applicability of GDR law
Since the German judiciary decided to convict the perpetrators by using
domestic law, they had to determine the applicable law. The question was
whether to apply the FRG Criminal Code, which involved the risk to violate
the prohibition of retroactive punishment, or apply the GDR Criminal Code
and annul the principle of justice with that.
The Unification Treaty provided the binding legal framework for the
accession of the GDR to the FRG in 1990 and made the criminal
prosecutions possible.76 The transitional provision of the Criminal Code
(Art. 315 to 315 (c) of the Introductory Act to the Criminal Code) provided
that the applicable law is in principle the law applicable in place where the
offence was committed. That means for acts committed by citizens of the
76 Unification Treaty of the Federal German Republic and the German Democratic
Republic of 31 August 1990 (BGBl II, p. 889).
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GDR inside the territory of the GDR, the applicable law is in principle the
law of  the GDR. Pursuant to § 2 (3)  of  the Criminal  Code, the law of  the
FRG is applicable only if it is more lenient than GDR law. Thus, the courts
were required to apply both, the old law of the GDR, and the new law of
the FRG. Only if criminal liability could be determined under GDR law the
second step, the application of FRG law, was possible.
The so called “two key approach” or “most favorable principle”77
determined in the Unification Treaty provided only a broad framework for
applying criminal law but did not provide more precise guidelines
regarding the prohibition on retroactivity.78
This approach was a compromise and reflects the unwillingness of the
FRG to incorporate the criminal law of the undemocratic GDR regime into
its own legal order. It also reflects the intention of the GDR to ensure that
its citizens would continue to be judged with the previous laws.79
2. Punishability under GDR law
a) Written and unwritten GDR law
First, the courts had to determine liability under GDR law. Art. 112 and 22
GDR Criminal Code criminalized homicide and incitement to commit
homicide. But the killing of people trying to flee across the border was
always seen as justified if the killing was committed as a last resort to
prevent “fleeing the republic “. Art. 27 (2) State Protection Act permitted
the use of firearms when needed to prevent the commission or
77 “Meistbegünstigungsprinzip” Kristian Kühl, Karl Lackner, Strafgesetzbuch, Kommentar,
26th Edition, Munich: C. H. Beck (2007), § 2, 16 a.
78 Werle/Vormbaum (2010, forthcoming), 28.
79 Rudolf (2001), 905.
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continuation of a “serious crime”. Art. 213 Criminal Code declared that
illegally crossing the border constituted a “serious crime” if committed “by
dangerous means or methods”. The GDR´s Supreme Court interpreted
dangerous conditions as the use of instruments, such as a ladder or rope
for crossing the border, or committing the “breach of the border” together
with others.80 Through that the impunity of the border guards was ensured.
The interpretation of Art. 27 State Protection Act permitted the firing at
fugitives who tried to flee across the border. The wording of Art. 27 (5)
only says that “the life of persons is to be spared to the extent possible”.
Within the practice of the law the border guards were given the suggestion
that no escape was allowed and the “breach of the border” had to be
prevented at all costs.81 Thus, Art. 27 State Protection Act permitted the
killing of fugitives. This notion was reflected in how the GDR dealt with the
border guards who shot people at the border. There were no
investigations, instead they were praised and rewarded by the superiors.82
As a result, the use of firearms was always considered to be justified. The
killings at the border, as a form of state-organized violence were
domestically legal. A conviction under GDR law would not have been
possible.
80 Gemeinsamer Standpunkt des Obersten Gerichts und des Generalstaatsanwalts zur
Anwendung des § 213 StGB, 15 January 1988, OG-Informationen Heft 2/1988, p. 9, 14.
81 State Protection Act.
82 Berlin Regional Court, Mauerschützen, No. (523) 2 Js 48/90 (9/91), judgment of 20
January 1992, translated in: Transnational Justice, Vol. 3: Laws, Rulings and Reports, Neil
J. Kritz (ed.), Washington United States of Peace Institute Press, pp. 576-585 (1995), 578.
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b) The approach of the courts
The German courts had to find a way to convict the defendants by
applying GDR law. Not until they determined culpability under the law of
the dissolved state they could apply FRG law as the most lenient one “in
favour of the defendants.”83 The courts interpreted the GDR laws in a
human rights friendly way to create culpability for the shootings at the
Berlin Wall under GDR law. They applied “natural” law in accordance with
international law to determine that the border guards had violated not only
West German but also East German law, which then left no obstacles to
conviction. By doing so the courts circumvented a violation of the
prohibition on retroactive punishment.
3. Prohibition of retroactive punishment
a) The extent of the rule of law
The fact that the solely application of GDR law did not suffice to convict
the defendants, the courts were confronted with the issue of retroactive
punishment. In situations where the new democratic system has to
prosecute human rights abuses which were committed under the
protection of the old order, the judiciary has to prove that it acts within the
rule of law. When leading figures of another legal system are the
objectives of judicial assessments, the courts are in the dilemma of justice
and formal law.84 The judiciary has to respect and protect the elementary
83 § 2 (3) FRG Criminal Code; Unification Treaty. With the mere application of GDR law
without a human right friendly interpretation the defendants would have stayed
unpunished. Thus, it seems ironically to apply FRG law for a more lenient punishment.
84 Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation”,
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, pp. 2009-2080 (1996-1997) 2024, [Online]
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principles of law against the exertion of political influence or members of
the public. How the prohibition of retroactive punishment is used by a state
determines to what extend the state under the rule of law is authorized to
prosecute the injustice of the dictatorship.85 Does the principle demand to
pay attention to laws and a jurisprudence which violated human rights? Is
the prosecution of the creators of the legalized human rights abuses a
human right violation itself because the courts would then disregard the
principle of the Rechtsstaat?86
b) The clash of two fundamental principles
The German courts had to consider the challenge between justice and
statutory law. This led to a clash of two fundamental principles; the
principle of objective justice and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
(1) Principle of Justice
The principle of objective justice (materielle Gerechtigkeit) demands that
evil acts should be subjected to criminal punishment.87 To kill someone in
order to prevent that person from leaving the country is clearly an evil act.
Although law actually exists to further justice, “law and justice are often not
the same.”88 Quite the contrary, law can be created for the purpose to
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?&operation=go&searchType=0&lastSea
rch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0044-0094 (accessed on 30 September 2010).
85 Gerhard Werle, „Rückwirkungsverbot und Staatskriminalität“, Neue Juristische
 Wochenschrift, 3001-3008 (2001), 3002.
86 Ibid.
87 Quint (1999), 310; Gabriel (1999), 397.
88 Kif Augustine Adams, “What is Just?: The Rule of Law and Natural Law in the Trials of
Former East German Border Guards”, Stanford Journal of International Law,  Vol.  29,
271-314 (1993), 273.
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work against justice. That was the case with the GDR laws which justified
the shootings at the border.
(2) Principle of nullum crimen sine lege
The principle of nullum crimen sine lege/ nulla peona prohibits punishment
if the conduct was not criminalized at the time of commission. It is required
that criminal liability has to be legally defined before the act is committed.
Thereby the citizens know how to behave and how to avoid committing a
punishable offence.89 The prohibition on retroactive punishment seeks to
protect legitimate confidence and intends to protect the individual against
state action.90 It  is  not  only  a  central  principle  of  jurisprudence,  it  is  also
explicitly written in Art. 103 (2) Basic Law which states that "an act can
only be punished if its criminality was determined by law before the act
was committed." This article is an expression of the rule of law and it is
fundamental to protect the trust of the citizens.91 This principle was also
reflected in the Unification Treaty which stated that criminal liability must
also be found in the law of the dissolved state. Art. 7 (1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights protects the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege as well.
The former rulers, who systematically violated human rights before,
referred to the prohibition on retroactive punishment when they were put
on trial.92 “What was law yesterday cannot be injustice today” has been
said by the defendant Krenz and meant that the fundamental principle of
89 Federal Constitutional Court, Streletz, decision of 24 October 1996, para. 47.
90 Werle (1996), 22.
91 Rudolf (2001), 906.
92 Werle (2001), 3001.
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the rule of law does prohibit to prosecute what was not punishable under
the old order.93 The German courts did not let the leaders shield behind
that principle in order to stay unpunished.
(3) Solution by the courts: principle of proportionality reflected in
GDR law
The courts wanted to bring the two fundamental principles in line, instead
of rejecting the GDR laws.
Although the Border Protection Act, the GDR Criminal Code and the
practice in the GDR allowed the killings at the border, the courts stated
that the shootings were not justified under GDR law.94 These laws had to
be seen in the context of the GDR Constitution which protected human
rights. Art. 30 GDR Constitution granted its citizens protection of life,
physical integrity and health. The use of firearms to hinder fugitives from
crossing the border has stood in contravention to it.95 From this, the courts
deduced that the government was bound to be guided strictly by the
principle of proportionality.96 The courts interpreted the GDR laws by
consulting the FGR law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Supreme and
Constitutional Court. They held that basic principles of human behaviour
and the individuals´ right to life must be protected. The freedom of a state
to determine what is lawful and unlawful was not unlimited when it comes
93 Krenz’ closing words in the appeals trial at the Federal Supreme Court. Reinhard
Müller, „Schießbefehl: Selbst nach DDR recht verboten“, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
(14 August 2007) [Online] http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F01
0EE1/Doc~ECEB2853DD7C44D04A87B76E579BBCBB0~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html
(accessed on 12 October 2010).
94 Federal Constitutional Court, Streletz, decision of 24 October 1996, para. 50.
95 Berlin Regional Court, Mauerschützen, decision of 20 January 1992, Laws, Rulings and
Reports, 578.
96 Ibid.
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to a violation of the core area of basic principles of human behaviour.
Intentionally killing of a person was a violation of the fundamental principle
of law and of humanness.97 The border guards and all the more the
leaders must have been able to recognize the few basic principles that are
indispensible for human coexistence and therefore they must have known
that their conduct was unjust.98 Thus, the State Protection Act and the
orders given by the leaders could not serve as a justification.99
The Federal Constitutional Court stated that Art. 103 (1) Basic Law and
Art. 7 European Convention on Human Rights do not hinder
punishment.100 The courts held that Art. 7 (2) European Convention on
Human Rights expressly recognizes that the nullum crimen principle
cannot be used as a shield for human rights violators. The limitation on the
provision against retroactive legislation states that this prohibition may not
preclude punishment of an individual who culpably committed an act which
was criminally punishable at the time of its commission according to
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.101 The trust in the
laws at the time of the offence did not deserve protection because the
GDR never practised democracy and the separation of powers and it did
not respect human rights. The decisions of the defendants which led to the
shootings at the border were grave breaches of internationally recognized
human rights.102 A justification of them would be contrary “objective
97 Ibid. 578, 579.
98 Ibid. 581.
99 Ibid.; Berlin Regional Court, Streletz,  judgment  of  16 September 1993,  paras.  222 et
seq.; Berlin Regional Court, Krenz, judgment 25 August 1997, paras. 271-273.
100 Federal Constitutional Court, Krenz, decision of 12 January 2000.
101 Federal Constitutional Court, Streletz, decision of 24 October 1996, paras. 49, 50.
102 Berlin Regional Court, Krenz, judgment of 25 August 1997, para. 272.
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justice.” The statutory law created by the lawmakers of the GDR was
unjust to such an extreme extent that it can only exist as long as the
responsible apparatus of power exists.103
The Federal Constitutional Court held that previous positive law is
intolerable where it is inconsistent with justice.104 In consequence, the
courts weighted the basic principle of material justice and basic moral
rules more highly than the principle of legal certainty. Accordingly, the
principles were brought in line with each other without dismissing the ban
of retroactivity as such.
4. Human rights friendly interpretation of East German law
a) Radbrusch`s formula - natural law
The German courts applied International human rights standards and used
“positivist” and “natural” law arguments to annual the GDR law.105 They
stated that the GDR`s border policing regime “flagrantly and intolerably
infringed elementary precepts of justice and human rights protected under
international law.”106 The “deadly shots along the border were a crass
injustice and they were in crying contradiction with the generally
recognized basic principles of law and justice.”107
The Federal Constitutional Court already recognized in two decisions of
1953 and 1957 the basic principle that laws, which interfere in “the core
103 Federal Constitutional Court, Streletz, decision of 24 October 1996, para. 50.
104 Ibid.
105 In detail Adams (1993).
106 Berlin Regional Court, Krenz,  judgment  of  25 August  1997,  paras.  271,  272;  quoted
and translated in: ECHR, Case of Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.Germany,  judgment of 22
March 2001, para. 19.
107 Berlin Regional Court, Mauerschützen, judgment of 20 January 1992, in: Laws, Rulings
and Reports, 583.
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area of the law, are null and void.”108 The Court stated the following: “It
was especially the time of the National Socialist regime in Germany that
taught us that the legislator can also legislate injustice, in other words, if
practical legal usage is not to stand defenceless against such historically
thinkable developments, there must be a possibility, in extreme cases, to
evaluate the basic principle of material injustice more highly than the
principle of legal certainty, such as it is expressed in the applicability of
positive law routine cases.” As a criterion for the existence of such a
special case, the Federal Constitutional Court points to the formulation by
Gustav Radbruch. Such a case does exists when the contradiction
between positive law and justice has reached such an unbearable degree
that the law must yield to justice since it is “incorrect law”.109
The courts compared the communist laws to those of the Nazi period and
applied the formula of “statutory injustice” in the border guard cases. They
stated that the orders and regulations of the superiors given to the border
guards did not deserve any respect and that the border guards might
refuse to obey them.110 Thus, GDR state practice with and Art. 27 Border
Protection Act could not be used as a defence.111
b) International law - positive law
The courts stated that the killings at the border were an arbitrary
deprivation of life in violation of international law. The border policing
108 Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG 3/232; 6/199.
109 Gustav Radbruch, „Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht“; Sueddeutsche
Juristenzeitung, (1946), 105.
110 Berlin Regional Court, Mauerschützen, judgment of 20 January 1992, in: Law, Rulings
and Reports, 579, 580.
111 Federal Constitutional Court, Streletz, decision of 24 October 1996, para. 50.
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regime put “the prohibition of crossing the border above the right to life”
which violated internationally protected principles of justice and human
rights. The courts referred to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.112 The GDR incorporated international law in its
constitution and criminal code as valid domestic law to be applied within
the GDR territory.113 Art. 8 (1) GDR Constitution provided that the
“generally accepted rules of international law serving peace and
international cooperation are binding upon the state and every citizen.”
Even if the GDR did not implement it in its domestic law the fundamental
principle of freedom to leave the country was binding. Thus the GDR
violated known requirements of international law. 114
5. The notion of indirect perpetration: The “perpetrator behind
the perpetrator”
a) Term and development
After the Nuremberg trials it was recognized that both, the leaders and the
soldiers are potentially responsible for state wrongdoings under
international law.115 However, the rules on modes of criminal participation
112 ECHR, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.Germany, judgment of 22 March 2001, para. 22;
ICCPR entered into force for both German states on 23 March 1976.
113 Adams (1993), 286.
114 Ibid.
115 The  Nazi  superiors  were  held  responsible  as  co-conspirators  in  the  waging  of
aggressive wars under Art. 6 IMT Charter; International Military Tribunal, judgment of ,
251; see Ilias Banktekas/ Susan Nash, International Criminal Law,  3rd Edition, London:
Routledge Cavendish (2007), 504.
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were rudimentary and some were directly included in the definitions of the
crimes of the Nuremberg Charter.116
Since then there was no concept to address responsibility along a power
echelon. Due to the collective nature of mass atrocity crimes, individual
responsibility for the particular contributions had to be established. The
question arose as to what extent superiors and subordinates could be held
responsible and if they both could be held liable as principals if they act on
different levels with knowledge and intent of the circumstances. The notion
of the “perpetrator through another person” was developed in domestic
law, confirmed through courts, later on applied by the International Military
Tribunals and finally adopted by the International Criminal Court in the
Rome Statute.
The concept of indirect perpetration through the control over the will of a
culpable direct perpetrator was first applied in the Eichmann Trial in 1961.
Hanna Arendt used the term “cog in the machine” for the soldiers used by
the Nazi leaders to execute their orders.117 The District Court of Jerusalem
articulated in the Eichmann Trial that “the degree of responsibility
increases as we draw further away from the man who uses the fatal
instrument with his own hands and reach higher ranks of command.”118
116 Art. 6 IMT Charter: “Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in
the  formulation  or  execution  of  a  common  plan  or  conspiracy  to  commit  any  of  the
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of
such plan”. See also Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd Edition, New York:
University Press (2008), 187.
117 Hanna Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 4th Edition,
London: Penguin Books (2009), 57, 132.
118 Jerusalem District Court, The Attorney General v. Eichmann, Case No. 40/61, I.L.R. 5-
14, 18-276, judgment of 12 December 1961.
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Probably inspired by this the German jurist Claus Roxin evaluated in 1963
the so called “domination over an organizational apparatus”
(Organisationsherrschaft) doctrine, to hold indirect perpetrators liable even
if the direct perpetrator is not innocent.119
To this time according to § 25 I second alternative German Criminal Code,
“perpetration through another person” could only be committed by an
indirect perpetrator who uses an innocent agent as a “human tool”.120 The
“mastermind” (the person behind the perpetrator) could not hold liable as a
principal if the direct perpetrator completely controlled the act and the
situation, both factually and legally, and also wants to exercise that
control.121 Thus, if the direct perpetrator was culpable, the indirect
perpetrator could only be held accountable as an instigator or assistant. In
German law the distinction between principals and accessories is based
on the theory of control over the crime, the “hegemony over the act”
(Tatherrschaft).122 Given the innocent direct perpetrator has because of
his “defect” no actual control over the crime, the indirect perpetrator is
culpable as a principal.123
119 Mark Osiel, “Mass Atrocity Through Hierarchical Organization: The ICC's Recent
Jurisprudence”, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2009, forthcoming); Claus
Roxin, Straftaten im Rahmen organisatorischer Machtapparate, Goltdammer´s Archiv für
Strafrecht (1963), 193 et seq.; Claus Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, Berlin: de
Gruyter (2006), 249 et seq.
120 see Rudolf Rengier, Strafrecht AT, München: Verlag C.H. Beck (2009), § 20 III 2.1.;
Johannes Wessels/Werner Beulke, Strafrecht AT,3rd Edition, Berlin Heidelberg: C.F.
Müller Verlag (2005) § 13 III 3; Roxin (2006) 242-270.
121 Michael Bohlander, Principles of German Criminal Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing
(2009), 159.
122 Adolf, Schönke/ Horst, Schröder, Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 27th Edition,
München: Verlag C.H. Beck (2006) Vorbem. §25 Rn 71.
123 see Rengier(2009), § 20 III 2.1.; Wessels/Beulke (2005) § 13 III 3; Roxin (2006) 242-270.
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Roxin argues that within his concept of Organisationsherrschaft both the
indirect and the direct perpetrator have control over the crime. The indirect
perpetrator acts through the criminally responsible direct perpetrator due
to his dominating power over a hierarchical organization. Coercive
measures and deception are not required because the indirect perpetrator
can be sure that his order will be executed almost automatically by a
member of the organization. Due to the fact that the perpetrator behind the
perpetrator does not care who physically carries out the offence, he must
not only have the intention to commit the crime, he also must fulfil the
objective criteria.124 Thus, he needs to have control over the act. The
element of the “hegemony over the act” is according to Roxin the
“fungibility” of the perpetrator who executes the offence. The individual
person who executes the offence directly does not count, since he is
“fungible”, thus, replaceable any time. The indirect perpetrator dominates
the system and “the anonymous will of all the men who constitute it”.125
The organization develops a life that is independent of the changing
composition of its members. Another precondition was that the apparatus
of power of which the indirect perpetrator made use was detached from
the system of law.126
The requirements in German law for “perpetration-by-means” can be
summarized as follows: (1) The indirect perpetrator must exercise effective
control over the organization, (2) which is characterized by its fungibility of
124 Roxin (2006), 245; see also Kai Ambos, “Individual Criminal Responsibility”, in: G.K.
McDonalds and O. Swaak-Goldmann (eds.), Substantive and Procedural Aspects of
International Criminal Law, Vol. 1, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1-31 (2000).
125 Ambos (2000), 19.
126 Roxin (1963), 200.
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its members. (3) Within this structure the crimes are carried out
automatically. (4) The indirect perpetrator must be aware of his power and
must have the will to control the organization. (5) The indirect perpetrator
must fulfil the mens rea and all (6) personal qualities with regard to the
material elements of the crime committed.127
This mode of participation closes legal gaps. The mere punishment for
instigation or aiding and abetting, which are modes of participation on the
second level, do not have the same impact. The intention of instigation is
different because the instigator has not the act as such in his hand.128 The
“perpetrator behind the perpetrator” has more influence and determines
the executive person through the hierarchical structure.
a) Application in the border guard general trials
This concept was affirmed by the German courts in the border guard
general cases and therefore found its way into the jurisprudence. The
guards themselves were held criminally accountable for their own actions
at the border.129 The leaders were held responsible as indirect principals in
co-perpetration under § 25 and § 212 StGB on the ground that they had
been members of the National Defence Council and the Political Bureau
and they had known that their orders would be obeyed.130
127 Jessberger/Genuess (2008), 861.
128 Schönke/Schröder (2006), § 26; Bohlander (2009), 154, 155, 167. In German Criminal
Law the punishment for instigation or aiding and abetting is lower than for committing
the crime as a principal.
129 Berlin Regional Court, Mauerschützen,  No.  (523)  2  Js  48/90  (9/91),  judgment  of  20
January 1992. They were convicted for homicide and sentenced up to three years
imprisonment.
130 Berlin Regional Court, Krenz, judgment of 25 August 1997, para. 275
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The Federal Supreme Court set out the principles for liability of superiors
in a hierarchical structure based on the legal principle of “control over the
act”. If the full responsible direct perpetrator acted based on a contribution
by the “mastermind” (Hintermann), which almost automatically led to the
crime intended by him, the indirect perpetrator acted as a principal as well.
The person behind the direct perpetrator “uses the framework conditions
prevalent in certain organisational power structures or hierarchies within
which his actions regularly set in motion certain trains of events.”131 The
courts acknowledged that those frameworks with regulatory actions exist
particularly within organised structures of the state and chains of
command. “If the Hintermann knowingly utilises these circumstances,
especially if he exploits the unreserved preparedness of his subordinate to
commit the offence as such, then he will have control over the act and as
such be liable as a principal by proxy.”132 The indirect perpetrator
“possesses the overriding will to control the act and he knows that the
framework conditions make any resistance of the direct perpetrator to his
plans highly unlikely. To treat the Hintermann as a mere secondary
participant and not as a principal would not do justice to the importance of
this contribution.”133
To prove the control exercised by the defendants, the Berlin Regional
Court comprehensively scrutinized the successive instructions which were
given from the men at the top down to the subordinates. The committee
131 Berlin Regional Court, Krenz, judgment of 25 August 1997, para. 275, translated by
Bohlander (2009), 159.
132 Ibid. paras. 275, 276; translated by Bohlander (2009), 159; Federal Supreme Court,
Streletz, judgment of 26 July 1994, 27 et seq.
133 Ibid.
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decisions of the Political Bureau and the National Defence Council in
which the defendants participated went on to the military chain of
command. Those gave the orders to the border guards who then shot at
the fugitives.134 The convictions of the GDR officials for homicide
committed as principals were an important signal. The single deaths at the
border were addressed to the leaders at the top whose decisions caused
the killings. This shows the entire mechanism of the repressive structure.
6. Criticism and assessment of the judgments
The German courts avoided to make an exception of the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege. They protected a legal principle formally but at
the same time they violated it practically. By interpreting previous positive
laws they created a new law. A conviction for homicide by the application
of FGR law would have retroactively dismissed the positive law of the
GDR. However, upholding previous positive laws for the purpose of
avoiding the violation of the principle on retroactive punishment means
protecting murderers´ reliance on the repressive communist law. The
prohibition on retroactive punishment is a fundamental principle which was
created for the situation appearing under a Rechtsstaat.135 A  state
governed by a substantive rule of law principle which includes the
protection of human rights.136 A system can rely on its laws, even if it
ceases to exist, if it was governed by the rule of law and respected human
rights.137 When it comes to human rights abuses, that principle should not
134 Ibid. paras. 15-138.
135 Gabriel (1999), 410.
136 Werle (1996), 22, 28.
137 Rudolf (2001), 909.
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play a role. The GDR regime cannot be assessed as a Rechtsstaat
because it obviously infringed the right to life and the right to leave.138 The
East German law justified the shootings at the border. The leaders of the
GDR enacted and maintained the laws and therefore practiced institutional
injustice. Nobody would ever doubt that killing people who tried to escape
from a repressive system to a democratic system is not homicide.
Consequently nobody would ever doubt that this crime should be
punishable. Thus, the German courts should have dismissed the previous
GDR laws totally instead of interpreting them. The East German citizens
who lived under the rules and laws for more than 40 years then had to
accept that their legal system as a breach of human rights as such. Even if
this could have led to lack of understanding in the East German society, it
would have been a clear statement that unjust statutory law, which
violated internationally recognized human rights, is not a basis to rely on
and cannot have an impact after the collapse of the GDR.
The interpretation of the GDR law did not reflect the practice within the
suppressive state. With the interpretation in favour of human rights the
courts assumed that these laws were misunderstood by those who applied
and relied on them.139 The leadership of the GDR would never have
138 The GDR did not fulfil the requirements for a state under the rule of law. There was
not a division of powers and civil rights were restricted. Gabriel (1999), 410; for the
discussion about the „Unrechtsstaat DDR“ see Rudolf Wassermann, „Wieviel Unrecht
macht einen Staat zum Unrechtsstaat?“, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1997) 2152 et.
seq. This is still a controversial issue. Recently, the former GDR politician and
presidential candidate Luc Joachimsen refused it to qualify the GDR as an illegitimate
state. Spiegel Online, “Linke-Kandidatin Jochimsen will DDR nicht Unrechtsstaat nennen”
(16 June 2010), [Online] 16.06.2010 http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,
701148,00.html (accessed on 22 June 2010).
139 Werle (1996), 28, 29.
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interpreted their own laws in the way the German courts did.140 If the
leadership were really bound to an interpretation that values human rights
the GDR would then have had another identity.141
The approach of the courts demonstrates that unified Germany was quite
unsure about how far they could stretch the law. That surprised, since
Germany made this experience before when it put on trail former Nazi-
leaders after World War II.142 Here as well, the courts did not dare to make
a clear statement that law in violation of human rights is not applicable
when it comes to criminal prosecutions of crimes committed under the old
regime. The courts were not able or unwilling to name the application of
ex-post facto laws. They accepted the prohibition on retroactive
punishment but through their interpretation of the previous law they
simultaneously applied ex-post facto law.
If the principle of nullum crimen sine lege is  to  be  used  from  a  state  to
protect murders reliance on law which obviously violated human rights, a
state governed by the rule of law and maintaining and protecting the
Rechtsstaats principle  is  justified  in  not  paying  attention  to  it.143 The
prohibition should not function as a protective shield for a dictatorship and
its murders.144
140 Quint (1999) 312; Werle (1996), 29.
141 Ibid., see also Silke Laskowski, "Unrecht-Strafrecht-Gerechtigkeit: Die Probleme des
Rechtsstaats mit dem DDR-Unrecht," Juristische Arbeitsblätter, 26 (1994) 161.
142 Werle (2001), 3003.
143 Werle (1996), 22, 30; Wolfgang Naucke, „Die strafjuristische Privilegierung
staatsverstärkter Kriminalität“, Juristische Abhandlungen, Band 29, Frankfurt am Main:
Klostermann, (1996). 47 et seq; Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law
in Political Transformation”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106, 2009-2080 (1996-1997), 2024.
144 Ibid., Gabriel (1999), 411.
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Retrospective justice also involves a significant risk.145 Retroactive
punishment justified through human rights can be politically abused.
Rejecting previous laws under the guise of human rights might be used by
the governments as an exercise of power. It can also be used by
governments to “designate scapegoats”146 with the goal to justify their
policy. As the author Brad Roth puts it, the “shield of human rights” should
not be used as a “sword”.147 The prosecuting state has to examine
carefully if it can apply retroactive laws to avoid arbitrary results. In the
border guard cases it was imposing that Art. 27 Border Protection Act
violated human rights.
Nevertheless, the application of previous statutory law can also strengthen
the effect of the criminal justice process. The perpetrators can identify
themselves with their conviction if they violate not only international law
but also their previous statutory law.148
Germany preferred the compromise approach to please the GDR citizens
who relied on the previous law and those who believed in the democratic
law of the new state.
Ruti Teitel states that the border guard cases “illustrate the dilemmas
implied in the attempt to effect substantial political change through and
within the law,” but the cases also involve “weighty symbols of freedom
145 MacAdams (2001), 259; Brad R. Roth, „Retrospective Justice or Retroactive
Standards? Human Rights as a Sword in the East German Leaders Case”, Wayne Law
Review, Vol. 50, 37-68 (2004), 66.
146 Roth (2004), 66.
147 Ibid. 67.
148 Werle (2001), 3008.
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and repression.”149 The conviction of the border guard officials sent an
important message that the new regime would be more liberal than its
predecessor.150
Despite all criticism the German courts found a correct result.151 The
courts weighted morality higher than the validity of previous human rights
violating laws. They understood justice not as equal enforcement of the
law but as the highest goods of a rule of law in a state of the rule of law. 152
The decisions condemned the shootings at the Wall and rehabilitated the
East Germans sense of justice and law due to the fact that they
emphasize the rule of law.153 They underlined the injustices of the
communist system which refused its citizens the freedom to leave the
country although it was granted in the GDR constitution. They aided the
German process of coming to terms with the past.154
Furthermore, the German courts did not only address liability for those
responsible for the crucial behaviour. They also remembered victims who
died at the border and stand for the other GDR citizens who wanted to flee
but were deterred because they feared being shot at the border.155
149 Teitel, (1997), 2022.
150 Ibid. 2023.
151 Werle (1996), 31.
152 Teitel (1997), 2024.
153 Some people criticized the strict binding to the rule of law. “We expected justice, but
we got the Rechtsstaat instead.” Bärbel Bohley, cited in Andreas Zielcke, “Der
Kälteschock des Rechtsstaates” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (9 November 1991);
MacAdams (1997), 240.
154 Gabriel (1999), 375.
155 Quint (1999), 327.
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7. Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
The judgment of the ECHR on the 22 March 2001 was the essential legal
final point of the criminal prosecution of the GRD system. The court stated
that the former Political Bureau and NDC members were guilty of human
rights violations and not the judiciary of the FGR which has prosecuted
those human rights violations.156
1. Statement to the German judgements
The ECHR held that the convictions of the former GDR leaders for
ordering to kill fugitives attempting to flee the GDR compatible with the
principle nullum crimen sine lege and consequently with the prohibition on
retroactive criminal laws under the European Convention on Human
Rights.157
The ECHR stated that term “law” in Art. 7 (1) of the European Convention
means, that written and unwritten law must be considered to find out
whether the conduct of the leadership officials were criminal under GDR
law.158 The acts have violated written law because the GDR Constitution,
the People’s Police Act and the Border Protection Act had the “principle of
proportionality” inherent.159 The practice of the GDR state organs has
been limited by the “human rights” protecting GDR Constitution as well.160
The orders given by the leadership officials were such a flagrantly violation
of the GDR Constitution and the ICCPR that the state practice could not
156 Rautenberg (2003), 97-130.
157 ECHR, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.Germany, judgment of 22 March 2001.
158 Ibid. para. 57.
159 Ibid. para. 63.
160 Ibid. paras. 67-76.
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serve as a ground of justification. That the state practice was kept secret
showed that the officials knew their orders were unjust.161 Due to the
“broad divide between the GDR’s legislation and its practice” it must have
been foreseeable for them that their superimposed provisions and secret
orders constituted criminal offences.162 The border-policing policy made by
the leadership could not be described as “law” within the meaning of
Art. 7 of the European Convention.163
Thus, the ECHR limited the full protection by the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege to laws enacted by the state governed by the rule of law.164
The most important statement was that “it is legitimate for a state
governed by the rule of law to bring criminal proceedings against persons
who have committed crimes under a former regime.” Therefore Germany
was entitled to apply and interpret “the legal provision in force at the
material time in the light of the principles governing a State subject to the
rule of law.” 165 The ECHR also stressed that the German courts were
correct to assume that the acts constituted offences in contravention of
international law at the time they were committed. The GDR had been
under obligation to protect the human right to life and the right to leave the
country.166
161 Ibid. paras. 67-76, 79.
162 Ibid. 78.
163 Ibid. 87.
164 Rudolf (2001), 909.
165 ECHR, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.Germany, judgment of 22 March 2001, para. 81.
166 Ibid. paras. 91-104; the GDR ratified the ICCPR and Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 10 December 1948 in 1974.
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b) Assessment of the decision
The ECHR also interpreted the GDR’s Constitution, statutes and treaties
and thereby took them seriously. Like the German courts they disregarded
that the practice in the GDR was unjust at all and not interpretable in a
human rights friendly way. The statutes and provisions in the GDR were
directed to commit inhuman acts with the cover of legality. By ascribing
them a human rights protective understanding the Court misrepresent the
unjust GDR regime (Unrechtsregime) and in the course of this a new law
was created.167 By assessing that the term “law” in Art. 7 European
Convention on Human Rights does not cover the arbitrary practice of the
GDR, the Court refused that law has to be understood as a mere system
of de facto rules. However, the Court thereby underlined the individual
responsibility, because then one cannot shield behind orders and acts of
others which pretend to be state practice.168
c) Decision with regard to national courts
The judgment is not only of high importance because it confirms that the
criminal prosecutions of the GDR injustices are compatible with
internationally recognized human rights. The decision of the ECHR is
pointing the way for other states which are confronted with the legacy of
gross human rights violations after the transition to democracy.169
The ECHR and the German judgments demonstrate the four approaches
states can take to prosecute past human rights abuses: using the previous
167 Rudolf (2001), 909.
168 Rudolf (2001), 909.
169 Werle (2001), 3006.
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statutory law; refusing it and applying the law of the new or prosecuting
state; applying international law; or the approach which involves the
biggest compromise, the interpreting of previous law in a human rights
friendly way.
The permission to interpret previous positive laws involves advantages but
at the same time disadvantages and risks for states which face the
dilemma Germany did.
In the German, and now as well in European legal practice, the
interpretation of previous positive laws in a human rights friendly way can
serve as an effective tool to justify prosecutions of crimes committed under
previous statutory law.170 Due to the fact that most dictatorships try to
shield their injustices behind a human rights friendly façade, there are
always links to interpret the repressive laws.171
It is a gateway for humanitarian law and in the same token the principle of
the prohibition on retroactive punishment stays stable. Even if it is not
about an international crime (war crime, crimes against humanity or
genocide) an arbitrary killing arranged by the state would be punishable
under international law.172
This is an extensive approach which also involves risks. Whenever a state
wants to prosecute but is actually hindered by previous statutory law, it
could open the door to international law and interpret those laws for
making them suitable. Human rights abusive rules become thereby human
170 Ibid. 3005.
171 Ibid. 3007.
172 Ibid. 3008.
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rights protecting. That creates a new law which ironically denies the
reality. The human rights violating dictatorship turns into a human rights
friendly dictatorship. The result of the interpretation would not correspond
to the positive law which was actually valid. The former leadership
definitely would not have applied the laws with the meaning the courts give
them afterwards. Quite the contrary, they enacted suppressive laws and
orders to deliberately circumvent observing fundamental human rights.
Instead of interpreting the previous laws in an international sense, the
courts could have categorized the crimes at the inner-German border as
crimes against humanity and thereby punish them under international
law.173 International criminal law, German criminal law and the European
Convention on Human Rights have the same principles: The prohibition on
retroactive punishment protects citizens of a suppressive state but cannot
shield leaders who violate human rights. Thus, human rights take
precedence over the sovereignty of a state.174 The judiciary of a
democratic state under the rule of law should be free to refuse the
applicability of previous human rights abusive laws.
d) Possibility to prosecute on the international level
Seen from today’s perspective the orders of the previous GDR leadership
could be prosecuted under international criminal law, if one would classify
173 Ibid.;  see  also  concurring  opinion  of  judge  Loucaides.  With  referring  to  the  IMT
Charter and Art. 7 ICC Statute he stated that the crimes at the inner-German border
were “crimes against humanity” and therefore punishable under international positive
law, ECHR, Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.Germany, judgment of 22 March 2001.
174 Werle (2001), 3008.
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them as crimes against humanity.175 The  license  to  kill  given  by  the
political leadership and executed by their subordinate soldiers could
constitute a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population.
When it comes to international crimes there is no more need of a
limitation, circumvention or even a violation of the prohibition of retroactive
punishment. In the case a state do not prosecute human rights abuses
which effects the international community as a whole, international
criminal law comes into play.176 The ICC Statute provides the basis to
convict perpetrators for their wrongdoings even if their conduct was
permitted by national laws. However, the principle of nullum crimen,
nullum poena sine lege is also acknowledged in customary international
law. Art. 22 to Art. 24 ICC Statute set out the principle of legality but its
standards are less strict than in German or European law.177 A conduct is
only criminal if it fits under the definition of Art. 5 ICC Statute at the time of
its commission.178 The International Criminal Court may prosecute
offences occurred from 1 July 2002 on, the day the ICC Statute entered
into force.179
Even after the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the
indirect enforcement of international criminal law through national courts is
of utmost importance.180 States emerging from a dictatorial regime to a
175 On the international  crime „crime against  humanity”  see Werle  (2009),  paras.  778-
927.
176 On the duty to prosecute see Ibid. paras. 192-196.
177 Ibid. para. 104.
178 Ibid. para. 108; Cassese (2008), 44.
179 See Art. 11, 24 and 126 ICC Statute.
180 Gerhard Werle, Florian Jessberger, “International Criminal Justice is coming home:
The new German Code of crimes against international law”, Criminal Law Forum, Vol. 13,
191-223 (2002) 194.
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rule of law democracy should decide to prosecute the past abuses to set a
signal for other states.
Chapter 4: Impact and development with regard to international
criminal law
I. International reaction on the German judgments
The border guard trials were discussed controversial worldwide. A reason
therefore was that the other East European countries based their change
of system after collapse of the Soviet Union to a large extent on
amnesties.181 Probably the new Eastern democracies had no other choice
because resolving the past with choosing to prosecute the state injustices,
could have meant a threat for the process of democratization.
Furthermore, the required unbiased jurists were not available.182
An American scholar emphasized the important purpose of such trials. He
saw the unprecedented institutional advantages in coming to terms with
the crimes and abuses of the former GDR in comparison with other
previous communist states, such as Czecheslovakia, Poland and
Hungary. Due to the fact that West Germany was a state of law for over
forty years the jurisprudence were seen as an excellent precedent for
dealing the guilt of GDR’s representatives.183
181 On the Hungarian approach see: Gábor Halmai, Kim Lane Schepple, “Living Well is the
Best Revenge: The Hungarian Approach to Judging the Past”, in: McAdams, James A.
(ed.), Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New Democracies, Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press (1997), 155-184.
182 Rautenberg (2003), 100.
183 See McAdams (1997), 240; Adams (1993) 271-314.
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Others stressed the violation of the rule of law by the German courts. Even
if the East German law was a violation of international law, the guards
should not have been convicted. The soldiers and the officials did not
violate the East German law so their actions were legal.184
II. Application of the principle of “perpetration through
another person” in other states
The notion of “perpetration through another person” is recognized in civil-
and common law countries.
The doctrine of the “innocent agency” is determined in Spain in Art. 28
Spanish Código Penal. The Polish Criminal Code regulates it in Art. 18 §
1. In France this form of liability is not codified but recognized in case
law.185 Anglo-American law also applies the classical doctrine (Model
Penal Code § 2.06). The “Black´s law dictionary” defines perpetration as
“the act of one committing a crime either with his own hands, or by some
means or instruments or through some innocent agent”.186 The
intermediary who executes the objective elements of the crime is not
184 Adrienne  M.  Quill,  “Comment,  To  Prosecute  or  Not  to  Prosecute:  Problems
Encountered in the Prosecution of Former Communist Officials in Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and the Czech Republic”, Indiana International & Comparative Law
Review, Vol. 7, 165 (1996), 191; Gabriel (1999), 378.
185 Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrechts, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot
(2002), paras. 568 et seq.; Florian Jessberger, Julia Geneuss, “Recent Steps of the ICC
Prosecutor in the Darfur Situation: Prosecutor v. President, On the application of a
theory of indirect perpetration in Al Bashir, German Doctrine in The Hague”, Journal of
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 6, pp. 853-869, (November 2008), 857; Gerhard
 Werle, “Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute”, Journal of
International Justice, Vol. 5, pp. 953-974 (2007), 963.
186 Black´s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing (1990), 273;
Elies van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of
International Humanitarian Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press (2003), 69.
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culpable because he either acts erroneously, is subjected to coercion, is of
minor age or otherwise excused.187
The Dutch concept of functional perpetration is not limited to innocent
agents culpable agents can also be used as means by the perpetrator.188
III. Foreign trials which faced the same challenges
1. The military junta trials in Argentina
The trials against the military junta in Argentina also were confronted with
the questions which law should be applied, how far down the chain the
prosecutions should reach and how to convict the leadership officials for
their cruel orders.
Those responsible for the prosecutions had to decide whether to
prosecute the defendants for their human rights violations in the manner of
Nuremberg by applying international criminal law or to use the national law
like the German judiciary did.189 They chose to apply domestic law which
involved the same problem as the German courts had. The Argentine
authorities made the cases against their former dictators on the basis of
acts that were criminal at the time they were performed. Thus they also
faced the “problem of retrospective lawmaking”.190 The notion of
“perpetration-by-means” influenced the trials. The Appeals Court held the
“chair of command” responsible on the basis of their control over the
organization. It determined that the “mechanisation” of the hierarchical
187 van Sliedregt (2003), 68.
188 Article 47 (1) Dutch Penal Code, v. Sliedregt (2003), 70.
189 MacAdams (1997), 259.
190 Ibid.
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structure ensured that the plan was successfully executed, even if any
particular subordinate failed to comply with an order. 191
2. The Alberto Fujimori case of Peru
The recent conviction of the former President of Peru Alberto Fujimori
demonstrates the influence of the German doctrine of the “perpetrator
behind the perpetrator” on international case law.
On 7 April 2009 the Supreme Court of Peru convicted him to 25 years
imprisonment for homicide, bodily injury and kidnapping in numerous
cases. 192 His appeal was rejected on 3 January 2010.193 During his period
of office from 1990 to 2000 he used his death squads to suppress his
opponents. For that he was found guilty as “an indirect perpetrator through
control over the will of another person in an organized hierarchical
apparatus.”194 The Supreme Court addressed responsibility according to
Article 23 of the Criminal Code of Peru, which recognizes perpetration by
means in the following language: “Any person who carries out the
punishable act, by himself or through another, and those who commit it
191 Federal Appeals Chamber of Argentina, The Juntas Trial, Case No. 1/84, judgment of 9
December 1985, in: Human Rights Journal, Vol.  8  (1987),  368  et  seq.  In  1986  the
Supreme Court of Argentina overturned the decision: Case No. 13/84, judgment of 30
December 1986, Fallos Corte de Justicia 309, 1689 et seq.
192 Supreme Court of Peru, Corte Suprema de Justica de la Republica, Sala Penal Especial,
Exp. No. AV 19-2001, judgment of 7 April 2009, para. 821 et seq., German translation in:
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, pp. 622- 657 (November 2009); see
also English version, Aimee Sullivian, “Translation: The Judgment against Fujimori for
Human Rights Violations”, Am. U. International Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 657-842 (2010).
193 N-tv.de,  „25  Jahre  für  Perus  Ex-Präsident  Fujimori  muss  hinter  Gitter“,  article  of  3
January 2010 [Online] http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Fujimori-muss-hinter-Gitter-
article662192.html (accessed on 12 October 2010).
194 “La autoría mediata por dominio de la voluntad en aparatos de poder organizados“.
Supreme Court of Peru, Fujimori, judgment of 7 April 2009, paras. 718-748.
 
 
 
 
50
jointly….”195 It was guided by the German approach of the control over an
organized apparatus of power, to hold Fujimori responsible as a principal
for human rights abuses. The Supreme Court made reference to the
German border guard judgments196 and  to Roxin197 who evaluated the
concept of the perpetration through a hierarchical structure. It stated that
Fujimori held the highest position of the state and created an apparatus of
power which made it possible for him to pursue his strategy of physically
eliminating the opponents.198 Although the crimes committed by Fujimori
were legalized under the old regime, the Court convicted him on the basis
of international recognized human rights. It referred to the international
case law and to the definition of crimes against humanity of the ICC
Statute.199
This judgment is of high political and judicial importance. It shows that it is
obviously not only a specific German aim to punish political decision-
makers as merely participants, but rather as principals.200 The Fujimori
judgment exposes in great detail and in an academic manner the concept
of the indirect perpetration. The concept of “indirect perpetration by
195 Ibid. para. 721; Sullivian (2010), 676.
196Ibid. para. 725.
197 Ibid. para. 726.
198 Ibid. para. 664.
199 Ibid. para. 714, Kai Ambos, „Politische und rechtliche Hintergründe des Urteils gegen
den ehem. peruanischen Präsidenten Alberto Fujimori“, pp. 552-564, Zeitschrift für
Internationale Strafrechtdogmatik (November 2009), 552; Sullivian (2010), 675.
200 Thomas Rotsch ,“Von Eichmann bis Fujimori – Zur Rezeption der
Organisationsherrschaft nach dem Urteil des Obersten Strafgerichtshofs Perus“,
Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtdogmatik, pp. 549-551 (November 2009) 549;
Claus Roxin, „Bemerkungen zum Fujimori-Urteil des Obersten Gerichtshofs in Peru“, pp.
565-567, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtdogmatik (November 2009), 565; Ambos
(2009), 564.
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hierarchical structures” turned into international practical applications to
allocate and establish individual criminal responsibility.201
Thomas Rotsch argues that the instrument “perpetration through another
perpetrator” is a powerful tool for combating modern criminality
phenomenon. He states that the development of the specific legal
definition of the “hierarchical structure” has reached its height in this
judgment.202
IV. International criminal law and leadership crimes
1. Marco-criminality in international law
Since its application by the German courts, the concept of “perpetration
through another person” has been developed from the national to the
international level in order to charge perpetrators with international
recognized crimes.
National criminal law focuses on individual responsibility and guilt for
domestic “standard” crimes. It does not have the special provisions to deal
with grave crimes which “affect the community as a whole”203. Thus, it is
not adequate in order to prosecute cruel leaders who used systematic or
large-scale force to commit human right abuses.
Conversely, international criminal law especially refers to collective,
respectively leadership crimes.204 The international crimes genocide,
201 Ibid.
202 Rotsch (2009), 549; see Supreme Court of Peru, Fujimori, judgment of 7 April  2009,
paras. 726-744.
203 ICC Statute, Preamble, Art. 1, Art. 5 (1).
204 Cassese (2008), 189.
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crimes against humanity and war crimes are executed by soldiers and
lower ranking officials, but commanded by superiors. Persons occupying
top positions in the civil government or the military usually do not
physically commit international crimes.205 Destroying a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group normally depends on a concerted action often
perpetrated, controlled or tolerated by a state or organization.206 Thus,
international crimes emanate from system criminality and presuppose a
multitude of perpetrators.207 The men at the top require accurate planning
and hierarchical organization to make sure that their plans and orders will
be executed.208 The various forms of perpetration make it possible to hold
the perpetrator criminal liable for his individual contributions in the
collective crime. Commission as an individual and joint commission
address primary liability as the result of one´s own conduct. Aiding and
abetting, planning, instigation and ordering, address secondary, thus,
accessory liability for a crime committed by someone else.209 A head of a
state or a brutal organization can certainly be held responsible for
instigating or ordering crimes which were executed by subordinates.
However, would it not be more just to punish him as a principal even if he
was not at the scene of the crime and did not physically carry out the
crimes? Is he not a perpetrator at the first level rather than at the second
level of liability? The degree of criminal responsibility does not decrease
205 Harmen van der Wilt, “The Arrest Warrant against the President of Sudan: Reasoning
and Implications of the ICC Decision, The continuous quest for proper modes of criminal
responsibility”, Journal of International Justice, Vol. 7, pp. 307-314 (May 2009), 307, 308;
Osiel, (2005), 1753.
206 Hans Vest, “A Structure- based concept of genocidal intent”, Journal of International
Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, Oxford University Press, pp. 781-792 (September 2007), 784.
207 van der Wilt (2009), 308.
208 Ibid.
209 For Individual Criminal Responsibility see: Werle (2009), paras. 440 et seq.
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as distance from the actual crime increases. Instead it grows the more far
the superior is away from the subordinate.210 The dangers of collective
crimes lie in the power which comes from the top down to the subordinate
level. A hierarchical system which seeks to oppress or exterminate a
specific group of people, gains more power the more control it has over its
own members. Mass atrocities can only occur through the organized
cooperation of many perpetrators who execute the crimes.211 The
collective operates together because the leaders at the top want to fulfil
their plans through them. Thus, leaders bear the highest level of
responsibility.
As a consequence, international criminal law had to design a concept that
provides criminal responsibility for political and military leaders who act
behind the scenes and do not personally commit atrocities. The aim was
to raise the criminal accountability of leaders at the highest degree of
individual criminal responsibility.212
It should be kept in mind that the individual perpetrator is responsible as a
principal as well. He can also not shield behind the instructions of the
superior because he is able to make his own decision if he wants to carry
out the crime or not.
210 Ibid. para. 441.
211 Osiel (2005), 1753.
212 van der Wilt (2009), 308.
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2. Jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals:
The doctrine of participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise
In the mid-nineties the United Nations Security Council established two ad
hoc Tribunals. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in order to prosecute serious crimes committed during
the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal
of Rwanda (ICTR) in order prosecute the Rwandan Genocide.213 Fifty
years after the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg that was the
first time that the courts had to apply international criminal law to convict
the perpetrators of the predecessor regimes.
The ICTY and the ICTR also faced the challenge of holding leaders who
are removed from the scene of the crime liable as principals. They
charged perpetrators whose conduct was covered by the concept of
commission through another with planning, ordering, instigating or
participation in a criminal enterprise.214 The Joint Criminal Enterprise
(JCE) doctrine extends the responsibility of participants in mob violence
and to those who can be qualified as the intellectual acting persons of
system criminality. The convictions based on the JCE doctrine
demonstrate the dynamics of collective action of international crimes. 215
213 Introduction of the ICTY and ICTR Statute; Blantekas/Nash (2007), Chapter 20, 513 et
seq.
214 Werle, (2009), paras. 456, 474; See ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-
1-A,  judgment  of  15  July  1999,  paras.  194  et  seq.;  ICTY  Trial  Chamber,  Prosecutor  v.
Vasiljevic, IT-98-32-T, judgment of 29 November 2002, para. 67: “(A)ll of the participants
in a joint criminal enterprise are equally guilty of the committed crime regardless of the
part played by each in its commission.”
215 van der Wilt, “Guilty by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise on Trial Possibilities and
Limitations”, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, pp. 91-108 (March 2007),
 91.
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Its extended form makes it possible to hold participants accountable for
consequences which went beyond the framework of the common plan if
they were a “natural and foreseeable consequence”.216
Convictions can be maximized due to the fact that perpetrators can be
held liable as principals for participation without sharing specific intent
regarding the crime attributed.217 However, the dangerously illiberal
doctrine 218 stretches the limits of joint perpetration too far. The conviction
of persons who do not fulfil the respective mens rea of the crime violates
the principle of individual guilt.219
Although the Tribunals apply a fairly wide approach to address individual
criminal responsibility, they do not acknowledge the notion of “perpetrator
behind the perpetrator”. In the Stakic trail the ICTY recognized that
“committing” means that the perpetrator participated directly or indirectly
as a “perpetrator behind the perpetrator” in the material elements of the
crime.220 However, the Appeals Chamber refused this approach since the
concept of “indirect co-perpetration…does not have support in customary
international law or in the settled jurisprudence of this Tribunal”.221
216 See inter alia: ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT-94-1-A, judgment of 15
July 1999, para. 228.
217 Any contribution to the realization of the common plan suffices. Werle (2009), paras.
462, 463; Cassese (2008), 191.
218 Mark Osiel, “The Banality of Good: Aligning incentives against mass atrocity”,
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105, No. 6, pp. 1751-1862 (October 2005), 1751, [Online]
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4099503 (accessed on 6 May 2010).
219 Kai Ambos, Internationales Strafrecht, Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag (2008), § 7, 32 et seq.
220 ICTY Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Staki?, IT-97-24,  judgment  of  31  July  2003,  para.
439 et seq.
221 ICTY Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Staki? (IT-97-24), judgment of 22 March 2006,
para. 62.
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In contrast, the German scholar Kai Ambos argues that the JCE doctrine
has no concrete legal basis in the ICTY but that the “perpetrator behind
the perpetrator” concept indeed can be based on Art. 7 (1) ICTY
Statute.222 The term “commission” in this sense would mean that a person
“participated, physically or otherwise directly or indirectly, in the material
elements of the crime through positive acts or, based on a duty to act,
omissions, whether individually or jointly with others”. Therefore he states
that indirect perpetration does include “perpetration-by-means”.223
3. The “perpetration-by-means” concept of the International
Criminal Court
The jurisprudence of the ICTY cannot be transferred to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) because it is an
independent body of law with its own structure.224 The ICC developed an
approach, which takes into account that commission demands the highest
degree of individual criminal responsibility and that therefore the material
and the mental element of joint commission must be constructed strictly.225
a) Individual criminal responsibility: Art. 25 (3) ICC Statute
Art. 25 ICC Statute divides the various modes of participation in four
categories.
222 Kai Ambos, “Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility”, Journal of
International Criminal Justice, Vol. 5, pp. 159-183 (2007) 182.
223 Ibid., Art. 7 ICTY Statute.
224 See ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui,  case no.:  ICC-
01/04-01/06, decision of 29 January 2008, para. 508 (with reference to Werle, (2007),
961)
225 Werle (2009), para. 466; Werle (2007), 947.
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Committing a crime as a principal is the first category and the highest
degree of participation.226 According  to  Art.  25  (3)  (a)  ICC  Statute  a
principal perpetrator can commit the crime “whether as an individual,
jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that
other person is criminally responsible”.227
Art. 25 (3) (b) ICC Statute determines ordering, soliciting or inducing of a
crime as the second category. Art. 25 (3) (c) ICC Statute refers to aiding
and abetting as the third category and Art. 25 (3) (d) ICC Statue provides
the fourth and weakest form of participation: contributing in any other way
to a commission of a crime by a group.228
b)  Art. 25 (3) (a) third alternative ICC Statute:
The “perpetration-by-means” approach
Art. 25 (3) (a) third alternative ICC Statute (perpetration “through another
person”) transferred the “perpetrator behind the perpetrator” concept to the
international level. This mode of participation, where the perpetrator
exercises control over the will of those who physically perform the material
elements of the crime, refers to a typically superior position.229 It makes it
possible to punish crimes where a person, who actually committed the
226 Ibid.
227 Art. 25 (3) (a) ICC Statute.
228 See Werle (2009), paras. 465-493.
229 van Sliedregt, (2003), 71.; ICC Pre-Trial Chamber, Prosecuter v. Lubanga Dyilo,
decision  of  29  January  2007,  para.  332;  ICC  Pre-Trial  Chamber, Prosecutor v. Katanga
and Ngudjolo Chui,  case  no.:  ICC-01/04-01/07,  decision  of  30  September  2008,  para.
497; Kai Ambos, in: Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, New York: Oxford University Press (2002), p. 767 at paras.
793.
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crime, was used as an instrument of the superior in the background.230
Like in the German concept, the notion implies control exercised by means
of an organized hierarchical structure.231 The concept of the ICC is wider
than the classical concepts in national law because it includes both,
innocent and culpable agents, which allows the application of the concept
to a broad range of situations. That the “perpetrator-by-means” is liable if
the direct perpetrator is not liable acknowledges the German concept of
the “perpetrator behind the perpetrator.” The addition expressly does not
exclude the possibility that the direct perpetrator can be manipulated, even
if he is also fully responsible for the crime.232
The including of this new mode of participation on the international level is
remarkable in two ways. Firstly, “perpetration-by-means” was neither
regulated by international law before nor was it acknowledged in
customary law. Secondly, it determines that this conduct involves the
highest degree of criminal responsibility.233
The importance of the doctrine can be seen on the cases with which the
ICC is dealing so far. The notions of co-perpetration and perpetration-by-
means are at the core of the case law.
230 van Sliedregt (2003), 68, 71; Ambos, “Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility”,
in: Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 2nd ed., Baden-Baden: Nomos (2008), 10-13.
231 Werle (2009), para. 476.
232 Jessberger/Geneuss (2008), 296.
233 Werle  (2009),  para.  474.  Some  authors  find  it  is  questionable  whether  it  was
necessary to include this form of liability because in international law the accomplices
may not be given a lower sentence than is available for principal perpetrators.
Furthermore it would downgrade the gravity of the acts committed, by those closest to
the crime. See Robert Cryer, Hakan Friman, Darryl Robeinson, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, An
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2008), 303.
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4. The application of the concept in current cases of the ICC
a) Katanga and Chui Case
The trail against the Congolese warlords Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Chui is the second and the most important current case of the ICC. It
stands as an example of how the “perpetrator by means” doctrine is being
applied in practice. The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that even an indirect co-
perpetration is possible.234
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter DRC) referred the
situation by itself to the ICC in March 2004. In June 2004 the Office of the
Prosecutor (hereinafter OTP) opened its investigation into crimes
committed in the DRC since July 2002.235 Katanga and Chui are accused
of war crimes (Art. 8 (2) (b) ICC Statute) and crimes against humanity (Art.
7 (1) ICC Statute).236 The  OTP  indict  them  for  murder  or  wilful  killing,
inhumane acts, sexual slavery, rape, cruel or inhuman treatment, using
children to participate actively in hostilities, outrages upon personal
dignity, intentional attack against the civilian population, pillaging and
destruction of property.237 Kantaga and Chui allegedly used their groups
234 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07, decision of 30 September 2008,
paras. 520 et seq.
235 See homepage ICC, Case: The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo
Chui: http://www.icc cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation
+ICC+0104/Related+Cases/ICC+0104+0107/Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo.htm
(accessed on 9 October 2010).
236 Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, (ICC-01/04-01/07-384-Anx1A), Prosecution´s
Submission of Amended Document Containing the Charges and Additional List of
Evidence of 12 June 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-649-Anx1A, Submission of Amended
Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Decision ICC-01/04-01/07-648 of 26 June
2008.
237 See marginal no. 235.
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(the FRPI and the FNI238) to exterminate the village Bogoro in the Ituri
district of the eastern DRC and murdered thousands of people from
January to March 2003.239
They are charged pursuant with article 25 (3) (a) ICC Statute with criminal
responsibility as co-perpetrators.240 The Pre-Trial Chamber frequently
referred to German jurisprudence and German scholarly writings which
describe the preconditions for establishing “perpetration-by-means”
through control over a hierarchical organization.241
aa. Control over the crime approach
The Pre-Trial Chamber first referred to the Lubanga Decision242 which
emphasized that the commission of a crime “through another person” is
the most typical manifestation of the concept of “control over the crime”.
As in German law, in international criminal law, the leading principle for
distinguishing between principals and accessories to a crime is the control
over the crime approach.243 Even if principals are removed from the scene
238 Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (hereinafter FRPI) led by Katanga, Front des
Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (hereinafter FNI) led by Chui.
239 ICC  Pre-Trail  Chamber  I, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui,  decision  of  30  September
2008, para. 466.
240 See marginal no. 235.
241 ICC  Pre-Trail  Chamber  I, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui,  decision  of  30  September
2008, paras. 482- 485, 493, 496, 498, 510, 514 et seq.
242 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Prosecutor v.
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, 29, decision of 29 January 2007.
243 ICC  Pre-Trail  Chamber  I, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui,  decision  of  30  September
2008, paras. 484, 485; „Tatherrschaftslehre“, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft: Claus Roxin,
Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil II, 8th Edition, Berlin: de Gruyter (2006), Chapter 2, paras.
25, 30.
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of the crime, they control or mastermind its commission because they
decide whether and how the offence will be committed.244
bb. Organized and hierarchical apparatus of power
Katanga and Chui operated within a hierarchical structure of an organized
apparatus of power. The two accused were in the top echelon and the
soldiers who acted as direct perpetrators at a subordinate level.245 Like the
German courts the Pre-Trial Chamber recognized increasing culpability
with a rise in the hierarchy. “The higher rank or farther detached the
mastermind is from the perpetrator, the greater that person´s responsibility
will be”.246
cc. Execution of the crime secured by almost automatic
compliance with the orders
The Chamber stated that the organization must be “composed of sufficient
subordinates to guarantee that superiors´ orders will be carried out, if not
by one subordinate, then by another.”247 The “replaceability of
subordinates” enables “automatic compliance with the senior authority´s
orders.” The control of the apparatus can be achieved “through intensive,
strict and violent training regimes”.248
244 ICC Pre-Trial  Chamber I, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, decision of 29 January 2007, paras.
138, 330.
245 ICC  Pre-Trail  Chamber  I, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui,  decision  of  30  September
2008, paras. 511 et seq.
246 Ibid. para. 503.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid. para. 518.
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dd. Co-perpetration based on joint-control
Katanga and Chui are not only accused for using their respective own
troops, but also for acting through the respective other troop, although
they did not have influence on it by themselves.
(1) Co-perpetration in general
In general the material and the mental elements for joint commission of a
crime require: (1) multiple participations (2) a common plan that envisages
the execution of a crime against international law and (3) an essential
contribution to that plan. (4) Each joint perpetrator must personally fulfil all
subjective elements of the envisaged crime himself (principle of
culpability).249 The perpetrator must have the awareness of the risk that
the crime might be committed in the execution of the common plan and he
must accept of the risks.250 The Pre-Trial Chamber stated that Katanga
and Chui were co-perpetrators because they had a common plan and
because both did an essential contribution to commit the alleged
crimes.251
(2) Extended form: Cross-responsibility
Although the troops of Katanga (FRPI) and Chui (FNI) “accepted orders
only from leaders of their own ethnicity”252, the accused may be held
responsible for the acts committed by the respective other troop.
249 Werle (2009), para. 472.
250 ICC  Pre-Trail  Chamber  I, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui,  decision  of  30  September
2008, para. 409.
251 Ibid. 419 et seq.
252 Ibid. para. 493.
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They had the common plan to use their independent groups to eradicate
the village. Their respective essential contribution was their acting through
their particular subordinate group.253
Between co-perpetrators, the crimes comprised by the plan, are subject of
mutual attribution. Indirect co-perpetration goes beyond that, since even
those crimes are being attributed which the co-perpetration could not
“control”. The crimes committed by subordinates who were not controlled
by the co-perpetrator “may be ascribed to each of them on the basis of
mutual attribution”. The co-perpetrator is then “criminally liable for the
crimes committed by the fully responsible subordinates of his co-
perpetrator”.254 This concept of reciprocal attribution extends indirect
perpetration to situations where the superior does not have the full control
over all direct perpetrators but where his contribution is essential for the
commission of the crime. The Chamber stated that the “essential
contribution may consist of activating the mechanisms which lead to the
automatic compliance with their orders and, thus, the commission of the
crimes”.255 The “coordinated essential contribution by each co-perpetrator”
resulted in the “realization of the objective elements of the crime”.256
According to the Pre-Trial Chamber, both acted with specific intend and
were aware of the circumstances that they would use both troops
subordinated by one of each other.257
253 Ibid. para. 519-521.
254 Ibid. para. 519.
255 Ibid. para. 525.
256 Ibid. para. 523.
257 Ibid. para. 520 et seq.
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Cross-responsibility as an extended form of indirect perpetration is a
consequence of joint commission, because both leaders agreed to commit
the crimes. Co-operation between leaders of different hierarchical
organizations can generate even more power to achieve the cruel
common plan. Especially, when it comes to prosecution of macro-
criminality where several leaders of different groups act together, this
concept can be an effective tool to allocate acts committed by soldiers to
their leaders.
The German courts also held the GDR leaders responsible as indirect co-
perpetrators although some of their contributions in the committee
decisions were less determining for the shooting orders than others.258 For
attributing the contributions of the others, it was important that they
decided together.259 They all had influence on the subordinates, just the
quality of the contributions and the political rank varied.
Katanga and Chui’s influence on the subordinates was different. Whereas
the GDR officials exercised the control jointly across the hierarchies,
Katanga and Chui could only exercise control over their respective
organized group. There were two hierarchies, commanded by two
independent leaders. The lack of control over the other group is
compensated due to the fact that Katanga and Chui had a common plan to
use both groups. Thus, in this case co-perpetration catches and
accumulates acts which are far moved from the indirect perpetrator.
258 Federal Court of Berlin, Krenz, judgment of 25 August 1997, para. 275.
259 All defendants had a full right to vote in the decisions which established the border
policy. Federal Court of Justice, Krenz, judgment of 8 November 1999, para. 49.
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b) Al Bashir warrant of arrest
The Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir warrant of arrest shows again the
influence of German legal thought on recent ICC case law. 260 The  ICC
charges him with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity for
the human rights abuses in Darfur. Allegedly up to 300,000 people have
died and 2.7 million were expelled.261 The prosecutor of the ICC referred
to the concept of “perpetration-by-means” to issue a warrant of arrest with
accordance to Art. 58 (1) (a) ICC Statute against the President of Sudan
who still is in power.262 The warrant of arrest is exclusively based on the
concept of indirect (co)-perpetration. “The prosecution does not allege that
Al Bashir physically or directly carried out any of the crimes. He committed
crimes through members of the state apparatus, the army and the
Militia...”263 The prosecutor stated that Al Bashir had the “final say about
the adoption and implementation” of the policies. The OCP emphasized
the absolute control of Al Bashir over the armed forces. He had imposed
his dominant will over the direct perpetrator and was aware of his role.264
260 First  warrant  of  arrest  issued  by  the  Pre-Trial  Chamber  I  on  4  March  2009  and  the
second  on  12  July  2010;  van  der  Wilt,  “The  Arrest  Warrant  against  the  President  of
Sudan”, Journal of International Criminal Justice (2009), 307.
261 Mike Corder, “Al-Bashir Arrest Warrant Issued By International Criminal Court“, 4
March 2009, [Online]
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/04/albashir-arrest-warrant-i_n_171703.html
(accessed on 7 October 2010).
262 See ICC homepage, Case: The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, [Online]
http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%
20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/icc02050109 (accessed on 9 October
2010).
263 ICC Public Redacted Version of Prosecutor's Application under Art. 58 filed on 14 July
2008, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-157, warrant of arrest 12 September 2008,
para. 39.
264 Ibid. paras. 248 et seq.
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Al Bashir could also be held responsible under Art. 28 ICC Statute which
addresses “responsibility of commanders and other superiors.” But this
form of participation is subsidiary to Art. 25 (3) and imposes a lesser
extent of responsibility, since it merely establishes responsibility for
omission.265
The warrant of arrest is the first action of the ICC against a sitting head of
state. This is an important international recognized sign and could lead to
more dictatorial leaders being indicted. Using this concept prosecutors and
judges demonstrate how warlords exercise their power and communicate
with their subordinates in order to accomplish their heinous goals.266
Chapter 5: Prospect, impact and effect of deterrence
I. “Perpetration-by-means”: development to a key mode of
criminal liability
Although there is no final judgment on the aforementioned cases yet, the
“perpetration-by-means” concept found its way into international law and
practice. Due to its application, the concept can be strengthened and
improved. As long as the ICC cannot refer to its own jurisprudence to
interpret the requirements of the concept, the guidelines given by the
German doctrine and jurisprudence can be used.267 The German courts
have not dealt with genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity in
this context. However, the evaluated preconditions and their
265 Jessberger/Genuess (2008), 865.
266 van der Wilt (2009), 308.
267 Jessberger/Genuess (2008), 866; Werle (2009), paras. 475-477.
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interpretations can provide some guidance for applying and sharpening
international law.
The so called border guard cases had a significant impact on international
criminal law. The German courts recognized the power which can be
generated by a hierarchical organization used by its leaders to commit
crimes through their subordinates. The concept of indirect perpetration
through a full responsible direct perpetrator provides the right tool for
constructing liability of those at the policy level. Through its determination
in Art. 25 (3) (a) ICC Statute, it is now used to charge warlords for their
cruel human rights abuses.
The “perpetration-by-means” doctrine also takes into consideration that
the perpetrators who carried out the crimes physically are criminally liable
as well. However, it is impossible to hold all perpetrators accountable for
their deeds in human rights abuses, especially when the previous regime
existed for a long period, as it has been the case in the socialist system of
the GDR.268 At least responsibility for those who commanded human
rights abuses on the highest level should be evaluated. The conviction of
the leadership stands vicariously for the liability from their subordinates. A
conviction of even these persons can be achieved only through an
extended concept of responsibility that attributes the number of wrongful
acts performed by others to their superiors.269 The doctrine addresses not
only individual guilt but also expresses the effects of a dictatorial
hierarchical system.
268 Osiel (2005), 1751.
269 Ibid. 1764.
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The concept of “perpetration-by-means” could play a central role and
possibly become a “key mode of liability in international criminal law”.270
National prosecutors in transitional democracies may apply the concept to
address “superior responsibility” for high-ranking past leadership. It
allocates responsibility between those who have different roles and
conduct at different stages of a crime. It includes the “small fry” who
execute the crimes and the “big fish” regardless to the culpability of the
subordinates. However, one should not leave out of consideration that the
application of this concept also comprises the risk of liability that goes far
beyond direct perpetration. For that reason the requirements for the
objective and subjective elements of the crime must be preserved strictly.
The extended form of the doctrine, evaluated in the Katanga and Chui
case, gives a prospect in which direction the concept will be developed in
further cases.
II. The German approach: Role model and guideline
1. Exemplary outcomes
Transitional criminal justice after the German Unification evaluated
important outcomes which can be seen as exemplary.
Germany demonstrated that a new democracy needs the courage and the
power to resolve the past by criminal prosecution. The judiciary has to be
consequent in the manner it charges and convicts the leadership of the
previous repressive system. Holding against all criticism and opponents,
270 Jessberger/Geneuss (2008), 867; Claus Kress, „Claus Roxins Lehre von der
Organisationsherrschaft und das Völkerstrafrecht“, 153 Goltdammer's Archiv für
Strafrecht, pp. 304-310 (2006), 308.
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Germany was serious about coming to terms with its past and found fair
results.
The German criminal justice process developed new approaches and
attempts for convicting superiors: The way the courts dealt with the
statutory laws and the mode of participation which they used to assign
criminal responsibility to the leadership officials, exemplifies the
application of modern criminal law.271
Furthermore, the criminal prosecutions after German Unification yield
contemporary history. They generated important historical information
since they explained the chain of instructions and the orders that led to the
violence at the border.272 The convictions state clearly who participated in
the repressive system and who helped the former regime to exist. The
trials stand for the evaluation of individual guilt of superiors and
accountability for state injustice. Since the legal response to systematic
injustice is a core problem of criminal law, the prosecutions in Germany
provided clarification, acknowledgement and legal disapprobation of the
injustices of the past.273 The German approach to deal with its past
demonstrates that in general the confrontation with the past by criminal
prosecution is necessary. New democracies should punish the wrongs of
the past. At least they should hold accountable those who have committed
271 Klaus Marxen, “Comment on Christoph Schaefgen´s Paper”, in Gerhard Werle (ed.),
Justice in Transition Prosecution and Amnesty in Germany and South Africa, Band 29,
Berlin: Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, pp. 27-32 (2006), 29.
272 Ibid. 27, 29.
273 Ibid, 30; Gerhard Werle, Introduction, in: Werle (ed.), Justice in Transition,  pp.  1-9
(2006), 2.
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the most serious crimes. For the credibility of a new system it is absolutely
vital to distance itself from its predecessors.274
2. Impact on other transitions
Germany chose the “prosecution model” to deal with the former
leadership. By doing so it gained important experience in punishing human
rights abuses of the past which are of use to other countries in the
future.275
Many other societies will emerge from a dictatorship, a totalitarian or
oppressive system, or a civil war, to a democratic state. They all will have
to face the task of building a stable new system by acknowledging the past
and reconcile the society. The key challenge of criminal justice is to find a
just way to prosecute the perpetrators who were involved in mass
atrocities.276
Only a few new democracies have chosen the option of criminal
prosecution so far. After the change of the system, the leadership and the
old rulers were mostly treated gently. Resolving the past by criminal
prosecution was the exception.277 Other ongoing or forthcoming transitions
such as in Iraq, Afghanistan, or in African states like Kenya, have to
challenge the same questions as Germany did after unification. The
274 Annette Weinke, “Comment on Christoph Schaefgen´s Paper”, in Werle (ed.), Justice
in Transition, pp. 33-38 (2006), 33.
275 Werle (2006), 1.
276 Osiel (2005), 1751; Kritz, “The Dilemmas of Transnational Justice” (1995), xxi.
277 Examples for other transitions see Albin Eser/Jörg Arnold (eds.), Strafrecht in
Reaktion auf Systemunrecht,  Band  82.1,  Freiburg:  iuscrim  edition  (2000);  Neil  J. Kritz,
“How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes”, in: Neil J. Kritz (ed.),
Transitional Justice, Vol. III: Country Studies, Herndon, Virginia: United States Institute
for Peace Press (1995).
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question of how to deal with the human rights abuses of the previous
repressive regime, and how to convict the leadership officials whose
decisions led to the cruel execution.
The German way of resolving the past took place under special conditions
and was unique due to the fact that a peaceful revolution in Eastern
Germany led to the complete collapse of the previous regime.278 The
significance of the German transition was that the GDR acceded to the
FGR. There was no new state created which is usually the case when a
system ceases to exist.
Criminal justice depends on various factors. The previous system, its
duration and how this regime was defeated have an impact on the process
of criminal justice. It is also influenced by political decisions, financial
resources and of course the will of the society, to resolve the past by
criminal prosecution. The judicial system must be stable enough to
undertake criminal investigations against high-ranked former officials. It is
also important that the new regime stand behind the way it has chosen to
convict the perpetrators. Besides difficulties in finding a stringent
argumentation regarding the prohibition of ex-post facto punishment, the
German courts were consequent in their findings and convictions.
It makes a difference whether a state undertakes criminal prosecutions
upon itself or whether they are imposed by another state. The unified
Germany was able to undertake prosecution by itself without help or the
influence of other countries. It also needs to be mentioned that the criminal
278 Werle (2006), 1.
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justice process in Germany was accompanied by other important
mechanisms.
In states in which the change of the system was forced, trials against the
previous leadership are likely to be imposed and influenced by the victory
power as well. The convictions might as a consequence be preserved as
“victor’s justice”279 and would not correspond to the will of the society.
Due to the different conditions in new democracies, the German approach
cannot completely be transferred to others. However, Germany created a
new standard for a transition process. If other states have to face the
challenge of criminal justice they can learn from the German experience,
its mistakes and can profit from its results. The approach can serve as a
guideline on how to convict superiors of a previous repressive regime. At
least the German criminal justice approach gives an incentive to young
states to create long-time peace and justice. The prosecutions stand as a
symbol for resolving the past injustices and to raise the awareness for the
past which prevent a recurrence.
III. Effect of deterrence
The German approach could have a deterrent effect on potential violators
of human rights and on states who hesitate to prosecute human rights
abuses.
279 This was an accusation against the Nuremberg Trials in 1945, where the allies
convicted the Nazi leadership. See Tomuschat, “The Legacy of Nuremberg”, Journal of
International Criminal Justice, pp. Vol. 4, 830-844 (2006), 832.
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1. Potential human rights violators
Subsequent prosecution of mass atrocities could prevent the committing of
them in the future. At least the conviction of a leader as a “perpetrator-by-
means” raises the awareness for the responsibility for collective crimes
ordered and planed by superiors.
The developed concepts could have a deterrent effect on states that are,
or become potential violators of human rights. States or organized groups
and their leadership cannot rely on unjust statutory law. They must be
aware that their human right abusive rules and practice have no legal
force when it comes to criminal prosecution. Even if the repressive laws
were valid in the previous system, they cannot shield the perpetrators
against prosecution. The awareness that laws in contravention of
fundamental human right standards have no international acceptance
could prevent the application or even the enactment of them. The
leaderships must fear that they will hold accountable and therefore refrain
to enact repressive laws from the beginning on.
2. States which hesitate to prosecute
The judgments can be seen as a warning for other states. New
democracies get under international pressure to prosecute the former
leadership of the previous system. The German approach demonstrates
that it is possible to handle the accompanied problems of criminal
prosecutions after a transition. Under customary and international criminal
law states are obliged to prosecute human rights abuses which occurred
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in their territory.280 If states refrain from prosecutions of human rights
abuses, they lose international reputation and cannot be acknowledged as
sovereign states under the rule of law. By not holding previous high-
ranking leaders accountable for their deeds the new democracy would
have a reputation of protecting human rights violators. By failuring to do so
they infringe human rights as well.
IV. Conclusion
Twenty years after unification, Germany is a stable democracy. The
transition process was successfully concluded through the combination of
different mechanisms to resolve the past. Criminal justice in Germany was
installed with unprecedented efficacy. It took about ten years, covered the
entire country and challenged the legal system. The scrutinized legal
issues are the practical difficulties a new democracy has to deal with when
a legal system ceases to exist. The judiciary was torn between observing
legal constraints and insisting on material justice, between paying tribute
to the victims and degrading the perpetrators, between satisfying
international and inner-political expectations.281 The prosecutions had an
influence on the German society and Germany’s image in the world. They
strengthened the stability of the new system and the confidence in the new
government. Regarded from an international point of view the criminal
justice process in Germany created and raised the awareness for the
responsibility of past atrocities and underlined the duty to punish abuses of
human rights. The German transitional criminal justice can be seen as a
280 Werle (2009), paras. 194 et seq.
281 Roth (2004), 39.
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pioneering role for similar situations where human rights abuses of
predecessor system need to be prosecuted.
The research proved the development of the concept “perpetration-by-
means” from the origin in Germany to its recognition in international law.
The national judgments and discussions had an influence on the
international law but conversely the international law has an increasing
influence on the national law. The research also demonstrated that
successor governments face difficult realities when they decide to punish
the injustices of the past. It must be out of consideration that in times of
transition, courts should restrict the prohibition on retroactive punishment
to convict perpetrators who relied on previous repressive laws.
Convictions can be perceived as retribution but they symbolize justice and
the seriousness of the new regime of coming to terms with the past. They
lead the system in a future based on honesty and reappraisal.
(19.932 words including footnotes)
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